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We consider an intermediary’s problem of dynamically matching demand and supply of heterogeneous types
in a periodic-review fashion. More specifically, there are two disjoint sets of demand and supply types, and a
reward associated with each possible matching of a demand type and a supply type. In each period, demand
and supply of various types arrive in random quantities. The platform’s problem is to decide on the optimal
matching policy to maximize the total discounted rewards minus costs, given that unmatched demand and
supply will incur waiting or holding costs, and will be carried over to the next period (with abandonment). For
this dynamic matching problem, we provide sufficient conditions on matching rewards such that the optimal
matching policy follows a priority hierarchy among possible matching pairs. We show those conditions are
satisfied by vertically and unidirectionally horizontally differentiated types, for which quality and distance
determine priority, respectively. As a result of the priority property, the optimal matching policy boils down
to a match-down-to threshold structure when considering a specific pair of demand and supply types in the
priority hierarchy.
1. Introduction
Operations management is about managing the process of matching supply with demand. We
consider a firm that periodically manages the matching between demand and supply. In each period,
demand and supply of various types arrive in random quantities. Each “type” represents a distinct
set of characteristics of demand or supply. The matching between demand and supply generates
type- and time-dependent reward. With unmatched demand and supply fully or partially rolled
over to the next period, the firm aims to maximize the total expected rewards (minus costs of
waiting compensation for demand and inventory holding for supply).
The problem we describe above is crucial to many intermediaries who centrally manage match-
ings in a sharing economy. Sharing economy platforms often use crowdsourced supply and match
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2it dynamically with customer demand. For example, commuter carpooling platforms such as Uber-
Commute match a driver heading to a destination with a rider to the same destination (or in the
same direction). Amazon crowdsources inventories of an identical item from third-party merchants
to its warehouses, to fulfill online orders. The nonprofit organization, United Network for Organ
Sharing (UNOS), allocates donated organs to patients in need of transplantation. In the center of
those business and nonprofit sharing-economy models, a platform is developed and maintained by
an intermediary to enable sharing-economy activities. Those models have the following features.
Heterogeneous demand and supply types. From the intermediary firm’s perspective, matching
between demand and supply of different characteristics often generates distinct rewards (or equiv-
alently, mismatch costs). We refer to demand/supply of different characteristics as different types
of demand/supply, and consider two possible ways in which demand/supply types differ from each
other. In particular, types can be horizontally or vertically differentiated. Horizontal differentiation
means that the characteristics of a type are not always superior or inferior to those of another type
(regarding generating matching rewards). Instead, the matching reward between a demand type
and a supply type is determined by the two’s idiosyncratic taste on each other. For example, for
a ride-hailing platform, riders and drivers are characterized by their locations, with the matching
between a pair closer to each other generating a higher reward (i.e., a shorter waiting time for the
rider and shorter idle time for the driver). Vertical differentiation means quality differences in the
demand/supply types. Under vertical differentiation, a particular type is always superior or inferior
to a different type regarding generating matching rewards. For example, from the perspective of
UNOS, patients and organs may differ in their health condition. A patient/donor in a better health
condition, in general, leads to a better transplant outcome.
Time-variant uncertainty on both sides of the market. In contrast to conventional business mod-
els where supply is often treated as a decision (e.g., inventory replenishment decision) or a fixed
capacity (e.g., in revenue management problems), crowdsourced supply in sharing economy activ-
ities may arrive at the system randomly and dynamically. For example, in ride-hailing activities,
drivers decide, on their own, when and how much time they make themselves available to pro-
vide service. In Amazon’s inventory commingling program, third-party merchants use their own
inventory-regulating policies and may be subject to various time-varying supply shocks.
We use a finite-horizon stochastic dynamic program to formulate the problem with the features
mentioned above. Next, we present an overview of the main results of the paper, as well as the
applications and implications of the model and the results.
3Main results, applications and implications
A key result of the paper is the establishment of the modified Monge conditions. Under those
conditions, a particular pair of demand and supply types should have “priority” over a neighboring
pair (i.e., a pair sharing the same demand or supply type) in the optimal matching policy. This
allows us to simplify the matching decision within a period, and focus on the trade-off between
matching in the current period and that in the future.
The optimal matching policy is complicated even for the static problem. For example, consider
a specific period t without accounting for future arrivals of demand and supply. On the one hand,
one may want to prioritize the matching between a type i demand and a type j supply if the unit
matching reward rtij is high. On the other hand, matching i with j may prevent both matching i
with another type j′ supply and matching another type i′ demand with j. If rtij < r
t
ij′ + r
t
i′j, it may
be undesirable to prioritize matching i with j. Moreover, the optimal matching policy is further
complicated by possibly saving a demand or supply type for the current period and matching it
with future supply or demand. In other words, there are trade-offs within a period, as well as across
the current period and future periods.
Under the conditions we establish in this paper, we are able to prioritize the matching within a
period. This allows us to focus on the trade-off between the current period and future periods.
Then we study two special versions of the model, namely, the model with horizontally differen-
tiated types (in short, the horizontal model) and the model with vertically differentiated types (in
short, the vertical model). Both satisfy the established modified Monge condition.
The horizontal model. We consider demand and supply types distributed in a metric space C
(which can be considered as the space of characteristics of demand/supply). The matching reward
between a demand type and a supply type depends on the “distance” between the two. The shorter
the distance, the higher the reward. We start by studying the case with two demand types and two
supply types. In that case, a perfect pair (i.e., type 1 demand with type 1 supply, or type 2 demand
with type 2 supply, both associated with the highest unit matching rewards) should be prioritized
and matched greedily, whereas an imperfect pair (i.e., type 1 demand with type 2 supply, or type 2
demand with type 1 supply, which has a lower unit matching reward compared with a perfect pair)
should be considered only when the corresponding demand and supply types have sufficiently high
levels (after the greedy matching of the perfect pairs) and matched down to some threshold level.
(We will define perfect and imperfect pairs formally in Section 4.) Therefore, the main trade-off
is between a lower reward from matching an imperfect pair in the current period and a possible
higher reward by reserving demand/supply to form perfect pairs in a future period.
4When there are multiple demand and supply types, we focus on the unidirectional case in which
C is a directed line segment, and the supply travels along a given direction to reach the demand
for the matching. We show that a shorter distance implies a higher priority, i.e., the optimal policy
would assign a demand type to the closest available supply type.
The horizontal model has the following applications.
Capacity management with upgrading. Upgrading uses a high-class supply to fulfill a low-class
demand, which is widely adopted in travel industries (see, e.g., Yu et al. 2015) and in produc-
tion/inventory settings (see, e.g., Bassok et al. 1999). Shumsky and Zhang (2009) study a revenue
management problem with fixed initial capacities of various supply types, and demand types can
only be upgraded one-level up. Yu et al. (2015) study the general upgrading problem, allowing
demand types upgradable to be matched with a generally higher-quality supply type. The upgrad-
ing reward structure in Yu et al. (2015) is a special case of unidirectionally horizontal types located
along a line. Thus our results apply to a generalized capacity management problem with general
upgrading and random replenishment. The feature of random supply is desirable for upgrading,
even for those revenue management settings, not to mention for the production/inventory set-
tings. For example, in car rental, car returns can be random, and in airline ticket selling, early
cancellations or airplane swaps can result in random capacity changes.
Commuter carpooling along a fixed route. Carpooling platforms specifically designed for com-
muters, such as UberCommute and GrabHitch, match riders heading to the same destination (or
in the same direction). In those cases, the matching reward has two additive components: The
first one is a disutility associated with the distance traveled along the fixed route from the driver’s
current location to pick up the demand. The second is a utility associated with traveling along the
route from the demand’s pick-up location to its drop-off location. The former is the unidirectionally
horizontal case, whereas the latter is a vertically differentiated attribute because, given the same
pick-up location, it is more desirable if the demand’s travel distance is longer. We show that if
riders and drivers head to the same destination at the end of the route, a shorter distance to pick
up a rider on the way has a higher priority in matching.
The vertical model. Each demand and supply type is associated with a quality level, with
higher quality types leading to higher matching rewards. In particular, we focus on the case where
the reward of matching a pair is the sum of the contributions brought in by its components, which
are increasing in quality. Then the optimal matching policy follows a simple structure, which we
call top-down matching (in an economic term, assortative mating): line up demand and supply
types in descending order of their “quality” levels from high to low; match them from the top,
5down to some level. Thus, the optimal matching policy in any period can be entirely determined
by a total matching quantity. This result is generalizable to the case where the matching reward
is non-linear but not far from being additive.
In the vertical model, the main trade-off is again between the current period and future periods.
The optimal policy will reserve some (lower-quality) demand or supply type(s), to reduce the
chance of losing or delaying the matching of potential high-quality types arriving in the future.
For two special cases, namely, the case with patient demand and supply and the case with
impatient demand and patient supply, we further derive monotonicity properties of the optimal
total matching quantity with respect to the state of demand and supply. We also propose a one-
step-ahead (OSA) heuristic policy, which is guaranteed to perform better than greedy matching,
and significantly reduce the degree of state-dependency.
The vertical model may shed light to the following applications.
Online dating. In the settings of assortative mating such as online dating platforms, the par-
ticipants of matching have vertically distributed attributes such as wealth and education. Becker
and Murphy (2003, Chapter 4, p. 31, Eq. (4.2)) assume that in a decentralized marriage market
the output of a marriage is the sum of the marital incomes of male and female. We consider the
same reward structure, but with dynamic and random arrivals of males and females and from
a centralized perspective. The top-down matching structure in our vertical model implies that a
centralized dating agency (or even a decentralized dating platform) may want to limit the number
of matching pairs at any time, in anticipation of future arrivals of higher-quality participants.
Organ allocation. Organ allocation decisions involve many factors, such as the efficient use of
organs and health conditions of the patients. On the one hand, organs differ in their quality (which
can be determined by risk factors such as age and cause of the donor’s death). Higher quality of the
organ in general leads to better post-transplantation health outcomes. On the other hand, patients
differ in their health condition. Those who are sicker suffer lower quality of life and greater risk of
death, and thus receive a higher benefit from transplantation. The top-down matching procedure
in our vertical model suggests that organs of higher quality levels and patients in worse health
conditions should receive higher matching priority, and it can be optimal to reject some low-quality
organs for patients in anticipation of high-quality organs arriving in the near future.1
1 In addition to quality differences, the matching between a patient and an organ is subject to compatibility con-
straints. The top-down structure sheds light on the matching among patients and organs that are mutually compatible.
62. Literature Review
We illustrate the high-level positioning of our framework in Figure 1. The proposed dynamic-
matching framework can be viewed as a generalization of two foundations of operations manage-
ment, i.e., inventory management where the firm orders the supply centrally (Zipkin 2000), and
revenue management where the firm regulates the demand side with a fixed supply side (Talluri
and van Ryzin 2006), and of a combination of the two, i.e., joint pricing and inventory control
(Chen and Simchi-Levi 2012). Compared with existing work in inventory and revenue management,
the supply in the sharing economy is crowdsourced and hence has uncertainty.
Figure 1 Positioning in the literature.
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Driven by real-life applications, economists, computer scientists, and operations researchers have
studied a variety of two-sided matching problems (see, e.g., Roth and Sotomayor 1990, Abdulka-
dirog˘lu and So¨nmez 2013 for a survey), which include the college admissions problem (with the
marriage problem as a special case), kidney exchange and the online bipartite matching problem.
We compare our framework with those problems as follows.
The college admissions problem and the marriage problem are preference-based, and focus on
finding stable matchings in a static and deterministic setting. In those problems, parties on both
the demand and supply sides submit preferences over options (see, e.g., Ashlagi and Shi 2016) to
the matching agency. As the matching outcomes (i.e., college admissions and marriages) can be
life-changing events for the participants, serious efforts in soliciting preferences are necessary. In
contrast, soliciting preferences may not be practical for day-to-day, or even real-time operations
in sharing economy activities. For instance, when riders hail a car on Uber, they do not have the
option, or may not even bother with which driver to serve them. To handle such situations, we assign
a “monetary” contribution to the matching between a pair of demand and supply types, instead
of adopting preferences by demand and supply. For example, a lower reward will be generated if a
farther-away car is dispatched.
7In a typical situation of the kidney exchange, patients and donors arrive in pairs, with an
incompatible patient and donor in each pair. Subject to compatibility constraints, researchers have
designed efficient matching mechanisms based on cycles (e.g., two-way exchanges) or chains of
patient-donor pairs (see, e.g., Roth et al. 2004, 2007) to maximize the number of matchings. U¨nver
(2010) studies dynamic kidney exchange with inter-temporal random arrivals of patient-donor pairs
and attempts to maximize the number of matched compatible pairs. Our model differs from his
by allowing arbitrary unbalanced arrivals of demand and supply, and considering the objective to
maximize matching total reward minus cost (i.e., social welfare or profit).
Online bipartite matching problems have many applications such as allocation of display adver-
tisements. Initiated by Karp et al. (1990), the classic version considers a bipartite graph G =
(U,V,E), and assumes that the vertices in U arrive in an “online” fashion. That is, only when a
vertex u∈U (e.g., a web viewer) arrives, are its incident edges (e.g., his interests) revealed. Then u
can be matched to a previously unmatched adjacent vertex in V (e.g., an advertiser). The objective
is to maximize the number of matchings. The problem has many variants, all with the focus on
algorithms’ competitive ratios (see Manshadi et al. 2012 for a more recent literature review). The
main difference from our model is the “online” feature, other than that there is no explicit notation
of inventory, with one side (e.g., advertisers) always there and the other (e.g., impressions) getting
lost if not matched. Instead of worst-case analysis, we focus on the expected value optimization.
Operations researchers have studied two-sided matching by the queueing approach or its fluid
counterpart. Arnosti et al. (2014) study a decentralized two-sided matching market and show
that limiting the visibility of applicants can significantly improve the social welfare. With a fluid
approach of modeling stochastic systems, Zenios et al. (2000) and Su and Zenios (2006) study kidney
allocation by exploring the efficiency-equity trade-off, and Akan et al. (2012) study liver allocation
by exploring the efficiency-urgency trade-off. Using double-sided queues, Zenios (1999) studies the
transplant waiting list and Afe`che et al. (2014) study trading systems of crossing networks. Su and
Zenios (2004) analyze a queueing model with service discipline FCFS or LCFS to examine the role
of patient choices in the kidney transplant waiting system. Adan and Weiss (2012) show that the
stationary distribution of FCFS matching rates for two infinite multi-type sequences is of product
form. Gurvich and Ward (2014) study the dynamic control of matching queues with the objective
of minimizing holding costs. Focusing on the fluid approximation and its asymptotic optimality,
the authors observe that in principle, the controller may choose to wait until some “inventory”
of items builds up to facilitate more rewardable matches in the future. We also make a similar
observation. Kanoria and Saban (2018) study a dynamic fluid matching model in which agents on
8one side receive proposals from those on the other side and determine whether they would pay
screening cost to discover the value of the proposing agent. They show that, suitable restriction
imposed by the matching platform on the searching of the agents can reduce wasted search effort.
In contrast to the above papers, we focus on the stochastic model (vs. the fluid counterpart) and
optimal decision making (vs. performance evaluation).
3. The Model
Consider a finite horizon with a total number of T periods. At the beginning of each period, m
types of demand and n types of supply arrive in random quantities. Let D be the set of demand
types and S be the set of supply types. With a slight abuse of notation, we write D= {1,2, . . . ,m}
and S = {1,2, . . . , n}, noting that D and S are disjoint sets. We use i to index a demand type and
j to index a supply type. The pairs of demand and supply are shown in Figure 2 as a bipartite
graph. An arc (i, j) represents the matching of type i demand and type j supply. Without loss
of generality, we consider a complete bipartite graph in the base model. In other words, any
demand type can potentially be matched with any supply type, apparently with different rewards
(or equivalently, mismatch costs). If a demand type is not allowed to pair with supply type j, we
can just set the matching reward between the two to zero. We denote the complete set of arcs by
A= {(i, j) | 1≤ i≤m,1≤ j ≤ n}.
The state for a given period t comprises the demand and supply levels of various types before
matching but after the arrival of random demand Dt ∈ Rm+ and supply St ∈ Rn+ for that period.
The distributions of supply and demand in one period can be exogenously correlated with those in
another period. But our model does not account for endogenized correlations among distributions
of demand and supply, e.g., a driver’s current pickup of a customer may affect future supply at
the place where the driver drops off the customer. In other words, we assume away the possible
dependence of future distributions of demand and supply on the current matching decisions.
m
n
Supply Demand
Figure 2 Pairs of demand and supply.
9We denote, as the system state, the demand vector by x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Rm+ and the supply
vector by y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Rn+, where xi and yj are the quantity of type i demand and type j
supply available to be matched. Although we assume that the states and the demand and supply
arrivals are continuous quantities (and therefore so are the matching decisions), our results can be
readily replicated if those quantities are discrete. On observing the state (x,y) ∈ Rm+n+ , the firm
decides on the quantity qij of type i demand to be matched with type j supply, for any i∈D and
j ∈ S. For conciseness, we write the decision variables of matching quantities in a matrix form as
Q = (qij) ∈ Rm×n+ , with Qi its i-th row (as a row vector) and Qj its j-th column (as a column
vector). There is a reward rtij for matching one unit of type i demand and one unit of type j
supply for all i, j.2 We can write the rewards in a matrix form as Rt = (rtij)∈Rm×n. Thus the total
matching reward is linear in the matching quantities. That is, Rt ◦Q≡∑mi=1∑nj=1 rtijqij, where “◦”
gives the sum of elements of the Hadamard product of two matrices. The post-matching levels of
type i demand and type j supply are given by ui = xi−1mQTi = xi−
∑m
j′=1 qij′ and vj = yj−1nQj =
yj −∑ni′=1 qi′j, respectively. That is, u = x− 1mQT and v = y − 1nQ. The post-matching levels
cannot be negative; i.e., u≥ 0, v≥ 0.
The unmatched demand and supply at the end of a period carry over to the next period with a
fraction of α and β, respectively. In other words, (1−α) fraction of demand and (1− β) fraction
of supply leave the system. Without loss of generality, we assume they leave the system with zero
surpluses. The carry-over fractions α and β can be time-dependent (in which case they should be
written as αt and βt). But because such time dependency would not affect our results, for ease of
notation, we suppress the subscript t.
The firm’s goal is to determine a matching policy Q∗ = (q∗ij) that maximizes the expected total
discounted surplus (i.e., reward minus cost). (Our perspective is social-welfare maximization. Alter-
natively, the formulation can account for profit maximization if rtij is interpreted as the revenue
collected from a matching.) Let Vt(x,y) be the optimal expected total discounted surplus given
that it is in period t and the current state is (x,y). We formulate the finite-horizon problem by
using the following stochastic dynamic program:
Vt(x,y) = max
Q∈{Q≥0|u≥0,v≥0}
Ht(Q,x,y),
Ht(Q,x,y) = R
t ◦Q +EVt+1(αu + Dt, βv + St). (1)
The boundary conditions are VT+1(x,y) = 0 for all (x,y), without loss of generality. In other words,
at the end of the horizon, all unmatched demand and supply leave the system with zero surpluses.
2 We can account for the case with forbidden arcs. If (i, j) /∈A, we can let rtij be zero or a negative number.
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Note that we do not explicitly discount future rewards in (1) because discouting is implicitly
accounted for by using time-dependent rewards.
A matching policy P = {Qt(x,y)}t=1,...,T consists of T mappings, Qt : Rm+n → Rm×n, where
Qt(x,y) = (qtij(x,y))i=1,...,m, j=1...,n is a feasible matching decision in period t for state (x,y).
As mentioned, the state of the system (x,y) is assumed to be real-valued without loss of gen-
erality. Nevertheless, our formulation (1) applies to integer-valued states (with α and β equal to
either 0 or 1; i.e., each demand/supply type is either completely patient or completely inpatient).
We can account for waiting costs of those demand and supply types that are not immediately
matched by incorporating those costs into the matching rewards. Suppose that a demand type
i (resp., supply type j) incurs a per-unit waiting cost cti (resp., h
t
j) in period t if unmatched. In
Online Appendix C, we prove that the problem with costs shares the same optimal matching policy
as that without costs but with an updated per-unit benefit of matching type i demand with type j
supply in period t as r¯tij := r
t
ij +
∑T
τ=tα
τ−tcτj +
∑T
τ=t β
τ−thτj . To see this intuitively, if a unit of type
i demand (resp., type j supply) is never matched, its total waiting cost from period t to period T
is
∑T
τ=tα
τ−tcτj (resp.,
∑T
τ=t β
τ−thτj ), which could be saved if this unit for type i demand is matched
in period t. Then, the per-unit benefit of matching type i demand with type j supply in period t
becomes r¯tij, which can be used as the unit matching reward in place of r
t
ij.
The existence of an optimal matching policy is resolved by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The functions Ht(Q,x,y) and Vt(x,y) are continuous and concave. There
exists an optimal matching policy P ∗ = {Q∗t (x,y)}t=1,...,T .
Note that the continuity and concavity in Proposition 1 hold only when the states and decisions
take continuous values. For the problem with integer-valued states and decisions, concavity is unde-
fined in high dimensional spaces. Nevertheless, an optimal decision still exists, and all subsequent
results still hold. In general, we expect the optimal policy to be state-dependent and extremely
complex. In the next section, we characterize some of its structural properties.
4. Structural Properties of the Optimal Policy
We are interested in matching policies with natural properties, e.g., matching an “essential” pair
of a demand type and a supply type before matching any less so pairs.
In particular, we compare two neighboring pairs of demand and supply types (i.e., two arcs in
the bipartite network that are incident to a common vertex) and provide sufficient conditions for
one pair to be more “essential” than another.
We first define a partial relation M to compare two pairs of demand and supply.
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Definition 1. (Weak Modified Monge Condition) We say that (i, j)M (i′, j) if (i) rtij ≥ rti′j;
and (ii) rtij − rti′j ≥ α(rt+1ij′′ − rt+1i′j′′) for all t= 1, . . . , T and all j′′ ∈ S. Similarly, we say that (i, j)M
(i, j′) if (i) rtij ≥ rtij′ ; and (ii) rtij − rtij′ ≥ β(rt+1i′′j − rt+1i′′j′) for all t= 1, . . . , T and all i′′ ∈D.
Let us examine the condition rtij − rtij′ ≥ β(rt+1i′′j − rt+1i′′j′) in Definition 1 (to which, the other
condition, rtij − rti′j ≥ α(rt+1ij′′ − rt+1i′j′′), is symmetric). The condition is easy to satisfy if suppliers are
impatient (i.e., β is small). If suppliers are relatively patient (i.e., β is close to 1), for the inequality
to hold, the differences in contributions to the matching brought by j and j′ should not increase
notably over time.
We further define a stronger partial relation for comparing two pairs of demand and supply.
Definition 2. (Modified Monge Condition) We denote the partial relation M by Ms if for
any (i, j)M (i′, j) and (i, j)M (i, j′), it holds for all t= 1, . . . , T that
rtij + r
t
i′j′ ≥ rtij′ + rti′j. (2)
We will show that there exists an optimal matching policy that is consistent with the
partial relation Ms . For a pair (i, j) ∈ A, we consider the two sets of pairs Bij,L :=
{(i, j′) | (i, j)Ms (i, j′), j′ 6= j} and Bij,R = {(i′, j) | (i, j)Ms (i′, j), i′ 6= i}, which contain neighbor-
ing pairs dominated by (i, j) under Ms . Note that any (i, j′′) /∈ Bij,L (or (i′′, j) /∈ Bij,R) is not
dominated by (i, j), i.e., either dominates, or is incomparable with, (i, j) under Ms . We also note
that (i, j) does not belong to Bij,L or Bij,R by definition.
Given the state (x,y) and feasible matching decision Qt in period t, the quantity ati := xi −∑
j′′:(i,j′′)/∈Bij,L q
t
ij′′ represents the remaining quantity of type i demand, after matching i through
pairs non-dominated by or incomparable with (i, j). Likewise, btj := yj −
∑
i′′:(i′′,j)/∈Bij,R q
t
i′′j is the
remaining quantity of type j supply after matching it through pairs non-dominated by or incom-
parable with (i, j). We then define a class of policies that respect a partial relation Ms .
Definition 3. (Compatibility) We say that an optimal matching policy {Qt}t=1,...,T respects
the partial relation Ms if (i) for all (i, j)Ms (i′, j) and all t= 1, . . . , T , either qti′j = 0 or ati = 0;
(ii) for all (i, j)Ms (i, j′) and all t= 1, . . . , T , either qtij′ = 0 or btj = 0.
Part (i) of Definition 3 says, unless ati = 0 (i.e., xi is completely consumed by (i, j) and those
non-dominated by or incomparable with (i, j) so that the further matching between i and j is
impossible), any i′ such that (i′, j) ∈ Bij,R (i.e., any pair (i′, j) dominated by (i, j)) will not be
matched with j. In other words, matching of (i, j) is prioritized over all (i′, j) such that (i, j)Ms
(i′, j). Similarly, part (ii) implies that matching of (i, j) is prioritized over (i, j′) if (i, j)Ms (i, j′).
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The following theorem demonstrates the existence of an optimal policy that respects Ms . Then,
in that optimal policy, matching of (i, j) is prioritized over (i′, j) in any period if (i, j)Ms (i′, j).
Theorem 1. There exists an optimal matching policy that respects Ms.
If only the weak modified Monge condition M is satisfied, we show in the appendix that there
exists an optimal policy compatible with the partial relation M in a weaker sense than Definition
3.
Optimality of greedily matching a pair of demand and supply.
We further provide sufficient conditions for greedy matching between a pair (i, j) to be optimal.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the pair (i, j) dominates all its neighboring pair by Ms (i.e.,
(i, j)Ms (i′, j) and (i, j)Ms (i, j′) for all i′ ∈D and all j′ ∈ S). Also suppose rtij ≥max{α,β} rt+1ij .
Then, greedy matching between i and j is optimal in all periods. In other words, in any period t
with any state (x,y), the optimal matching quantity between i and j is qt∗ij = min{xi, yj}.
In the rest of the paper, we refer to the pair (i, j) as a perfect pair if it dominates all its
neighboring pair by Ms . Any other pair is referred to as an imperfect pair.
As an immediate application of Proposition 2, consider demand and supply types that are spec-
ified by their locations in an Euclidean space (e.g., Uber drivers and riders in different locations;
products and customers in different locations for Amazon’s inventory commingling program). In
each period, the reward of matching supply with demand is a fixed prize minus the disutility pro-
portional to the Euclidean distance between the demand location and the supply location (i.e.,
rtij =Rt− γtdistij, where distij represents the Euclidean distance between i and j). If the param-
eter γt is decreasing in time, we can verify that a demand type and a supply type from the same
location forms a perfect pair, and by Proposition 2, they should be matched as much as possible.
Corollary 1. Suppose that the demand and supply types are uniquely characterized by their
spatial locations. The per-unit matching reward in period t between i ∈ D and j ∈ S is rtij =Rt −
γtdistij, where distij is the Euclidean distance between i and j’s locations. If both Rt and γt are
decreasing in t, i and j should be matched greedily in any period.
The partial relations defined in Definitions 1 and 2 are reminiscent of the classic Monge sequence
discovered by Gaspard Monge, a French mathematician, in 1781. Hoffman (1963) provides a nec-
essary and sufficient condition for a static transportation problem to be solvable by a greedy
algorithm, in which a permutation (referred to as the Monge sequence) is followed. The Monge
condition provides a priority sequence for all the arcs (i.e., demand-supply pairs) in the bipartite
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network and requires only condition (2) of Definition 2. Our Definitions 1 and 2 compare two
neighboring arcs to determine their priorities in the setting with the dynamic and stochastic arrival
of demand and supply types over time. Naturally, our conditions may appear more restrictive than
the requirements of the Monge sequence because our problem is more complex. In particular, to
compare (i, j) and (i′, j) we require the inequality rtij − rti′j ≥ α(rt+1ij′′ − rt+1i′j′′) to hold for all j′′ ∈ S.
(Similarly, to compare (i, j) and (i, j′) we require rtij − rtij′ ≥ β(rt+1i′′j − rt+1i′′j′) to hold for all i′′ ∈D.)
Nevertheless, in subsequent sections, we show that those conditions are satisfied by two classes of
problems, namely the horizontal model and the vertical model.
Remark 1. Our model and results can be generalized to the case with time-dependent carry-
over rates. Suppose that in period t, a fraction αt of the unmatched demand and a fraction βt
of the unmatched supply will carry over to the next period t+ 1, for any type of demand and
supply. Then, in Definition 1, the conditions rtij− rti′j ≥ α(rtij′′ − rti′j′′) and rtij− rtij′ ≥ β(rti′′j− rti′′j′)
should be replaced with rtij − rti′j ≥ αt(rtij′′ − rti′j′′) and rtij − rtij′ ≥ βt(rti′′j − rti′′j′), respectively. All
subsequent results remain true. For example, Proposition 2 still holds if we replace the condition
rtij ≥max{α,β} rt+1ij with rtij ≥max{αt, βt} rt+1ij .
5. Horizontally Differentiated Types
Consider demand and supply types located in a space C. Each point in C represents the characteris-
tics of the corresponding (demand/supply) type. A shorter distance between i∈D and j ∈ S implies
a higher unit matching reward in each period. Thus, the types are “horizontally” distributed.
5.1. Two demand types and two supply types
We begin with the space C consisting of two distinct locations, namely, locations 1 and 2. There
are two demand types and two supply types, D= {1,2} and S = {1,2}. Type 1 demand and type
1 supply share location 1, while type 2 demand and type 2 supply co-locate at location 2. For
k= 1,2, we denote the other index in the set {1,2} by −k, i.e., −k= 3−k. Since a shorter distance
implies a higher reward, we make the following two assumptions for the rest of this subsection.
Assumption 1. rtkk ≥max{rtk,−k, rt−k,k}, for k= 1,2.
The next assumption further compares the unit matching rewards across different periods.
Assumption 2. For any k ∈ {1,2}, all i ∈ D, j ∈ S and t = 1, . . . , T , rtkk − rtk,−k ≥ rt+1ik − rt+1i,−k
and rtkk− rt−k,k ≥ rt+1kj − rt+1−kj.
From Assumptions 1 and 2 it is straightforward to verify that (k, k)Ms (k,−k) and (k, k)Ms
(−k, k) for k = 1,2. In other words, demand type 1 and supply type 1 form a perfect pair, and
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so do demand type 2 and supply type 2, while (k,−k) is an imperfect pair, for k = 1,2. As an
application, consider a premier service and a regular service (e.g., luxury vs. economy car services)
provided by crowdsourced suppliers. The fares for the two services are fp and fr, respectively.
The intermediary firm pays the two types of suppliers cp and cr, respectively. If the firm offers
the premier service to a customer requesting the regular service, the customer will only pay the
regular fare (i.e., free upgrading). However, the intermediary firm still needs to pay the premier
wage cp to the premier service provider. If a customer originally requesting the premier service is
offered the regular service, s/he also pays the regular fare, with a possible penalty cost pi incurred
to the firm (monetary compensation, loss of goodwill, etc.) It is natural to assume that fp > fr,
cp > cr and that the margin of the premier service fp− cp is higher than that of the regular service
fr − cr. Then, the reward for matching a premier customer with a premier supplier (i.e., fp − cp)
is higher than that for matching a premier customer with a regular supplier (i.e., fr − cr − pi),
and also higher than that for matching a regular customer with a premier supplier (i.e., fr − cp).
Likewise, matching a regular customer with a regular supply (i.e., fr − cr) generates more reward
than matching a regular customer with a premier supplier (i.e., fr − cp), and than matching a
premier customer with a regular supplier (i.e., fr − cr − pi). This verifies Assumption 1, and as a
result, Assumption 2 trivially holds when the parameters are assumed to be time-independent.
It follows directly from Proposition 2 that type 1 demand should be matched with type 1 supply
as much as possible, before we match type 1 demand with type 2 supply, or type 2 demand with
type 1 supply. Likewise, type 2 demand should be matched with type 2 supply greedily. Clearly,
after greedy matching between the pair (k, k), there cannot be any positive remaining quantity
for both demand type k and supply type k (k = 1,2). This observation allows us to collapse the
state space: In period t with the (original) state (x,y) = (x1, x2, y1, y2), we define the new state
as z := (z1, z2), where z1 = x1 − y1, z2 = y2 − x2. The quantity z1 describes the imbalance between
type 1 demand and type 1 supply. A nonnegative z1 represents the remaining quantity of type
1 demand after greedy matching with type 1 supply in period t (the remaining quantity of type
1 supply will be zero). For a negative value of z1, z
−
1 = −z1 is the remaining quantity of type 1
supply after greedy matching with type 1 demand. Similarly, z+2 is the remaining quantity of type
2 supply after greedy matching with type 2 demand, whereas z−2 is the remaining quantity of type
2 demand after greedy matching with type 2 supply.
After the first round of greedy matching in period t, if there are remaining type k demand and
type −k supply (k = 1,2) simultaneously (i.e., either z1 > 0 and z2 > 0, or z1 < 0 and z2 < 0), we
will match the two with each other, but not necessarily in a greedy way. The intermediary may
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withhold some type k demand in order to match it with type k supply in a future period (or
withhold type −k supply to match with type −k demand in the future). The amount of type k
demand to withhold generally depends on the available amount of type −k supply. For example, if
there is a high level of type −k supply in the current period, it is unlikely for all of those supply to
meet type −k demand (i.e., its best match) in the future, and we may, therefore, use more type k
demand to match with type −k supply. Symmetrically, the amount of type −k supply to withhold
depends on the available type k demand. Thus, the matching between an imperfect pair is governed
by state-dependent match-down-to target levels, where the state-dependency is one-dimensional
(e.g., the target level for type k demand depends only on the available type −k supply).
To formalize the above discussion, we define IB := z1 − z2 = x1 + x2 − y1 − y2 as the aggregate
imbalance between demand and supply. We describe the structure of the optimal policy as follows.
Proposition 3. The optimal policy performs two rounds of matching in each period t.
• Round 1: Matching of perfect pairs.
For k= 1,2, match type k demand with type k supply greedily.
• Round 2: Matching of an imperfect pair.
(i) No matching in round 2 if z1z2 ≤ 0.
(ii) If z1 > 0 and z2 > 0, match type 1 demand and type 2 supply. There exist protection levels p
t,IB
d,+
and pt,IBs,+ dependent on the imbalance IB, such that p
t,IB
d,+ −pt,IBs,+ = IB, and the matching between
the pair (1,2) reduces type 1 demand to min
¶
z1, p
t,IB
d,+
©
and type 2 supply to min
¶
z2, p
t,IB
s,+
©
.
(iii) If z1 < 0 and z2 < 0, match type 2 demand and type 1 supply. There exist protection levels p
t,IB
d,−
and pt,IBs,− dependent on IB, such that p
t,IB
d,− −pt,IBs,− = IB, and that the matching between the pair
(2,1) reduces type 2 demand to min
¶
−z2, pt,IBd,−
©
and type 1 supply to min
¶
−z1, pt,IBs,−
©
.
According to Proposition 3, the matching of round 2 is dependent on the state z. When z1z2 ≤ 0,
after round 1, either both type 1 and type 2 supply are depleted, or both type 1 and type 2 demand
are depleted. With neither supply nor demand is available, there is no matching in round 2.
When z1 > 0 and z2 > 0, we have remaining quantities of type 1 demand and type 2 supply.
Part (ii) of Proposition 3 shows that the matching between the pair (1,2) is characterized by the
protection levels pt,IBd,+ and p
t,IB
s,+ , which are the target levels to reduce type 1 demand and type 2
supply to, respectively. In the beginning of round 2, if the quantity z1 of available type 1 demand
is above pt,IBd,+ , the optimal policy will reduce it to p
t,IB
d,+ (by the quantity z1− pt,IBd,+ ) by matching it
with type 2 supply. In the mean time, the relation pt,IBd,+ − pt,IBs,+ = IB guarantees that type 2 supply
will be reduced to z2 − (z1 − pt,IBd,+ ) = pt,IBd,+ − IB = pt,IBs,+ . If z1 is below pt,IBd,+ , there is no matching
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and type 1 demand remains at the level of z1. (Note that z1 ≤ pt,IBd,+ implies z2 ≤ pt,IBs,+ , hence type
2 supply remains at the level of z2.)
The state-dependent protection levels pt,IBd,+ and p
t,IB
s,+ only depend on the one-dimensional quantity
IB = z1 − z2 rather than on the full, two-dimensional state z. The case of z1 < 0 and z2 < 0 is
symmetric to the case of z1 > 0 and z2 > 0. We further consider two special cases, for which we will
characterize the properties of the protection levels with respect to the state.
Patient demand and supply types
Consider α= β = 1, i.e., demand and supply are infinitely patient and stay until they are matched.
Proposition 4. The protection levels pt,IBd,+ and p
t,IB
d,− for round 2 matching are increasing in the
aggregate imbalance IB. The protection levels pt,IBs,+ and p
t,IB
s,− are decreasing in IB. Moreover, the
decreasing and increasing rates are no higher than 1.
Proposition 4 examines the monotonicity of the protection levels with respect to the aggregate
imbalance. We interpret the proposition as follows.
When IB ≥ 0, demand is in excess. A higher value of IB suggests more demand over supply. The
chance of a demand type meeting a better match in a future period becomes smaller. Therefore
it becomes more imperative to consume more demand by lowering the protection level for supply.
As a result, the protection levels pt,IBs,+ and p
t,IB
s,− decrease as IB increases. The rate of decrease,
however, is no higher than 1, which implies that the increment in IB (i.e., extra demand more than
supply) will not be entirely matched in the current period, through reducing the protection level
for supply. The relations pt,IBd,+ − pt,IBs,+ = IB and pt,IBd,− − pt,IBs,− = IB then immediately imply that pt,IBd,+
and pt,IBd,− are increasing in IB with the increasing rates capped by 1.
When IB < 0, supply is in excess. A larger IB suggests less supply in excess of demand. Thus, it
is less imperative to consume the excess in supply, implying a higher protection level for demand.
Proposition 4 is particularly helpful when demand and supply quantities take integer values. In
that case, once we obtained the value of the protection level pt,IBd,+ , the protection level p
t,IB+1
d,+ is
either pt,IBd,+ or p
t,IB
d,+ + 1, whichever yields higher matching rewards.
Although we have assumed α= β = 1, Proposition 4 is generalizable to the case with arbitrary
values of α and β as long as the two carry-over rates are equal to each other (i.e., α= β).
Impatient demand types and patient supply types
Consider α = 0 and β = 1. In this case, demand is impatient and is lost if not matched in the
current period. Thus we only need to record supply levels as the system state. Then, round 2
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matching is fully characterized by protection levels on the supply side only, as shown in the following
proposition. For ease of notation, let a∧ b := min{a, b} be the smaller of two numbers a and b.
Proposition 5. There exist state-independent protection levels pts,+ and p
t
s,− such that in round
2 matching of period t,
(i) if z1 > 0 and z2 > 0, the optimal matching policy reduces type 2 supply as close to the protection
level pts,+ as possible; the post-matching level of type 2 supply is max
¶
z2− z1, z2 ∧ pts,+
©
;
(ii) if z1 < 0 and z2 < 0, the optimal matching policy reduces type 1 supply as close to the to
protection level pts,− as possible; the post-matching level of max
¶
z2− z1, (−z1)∧ pts,−
©
.
Proposition 5 shows that the optimal policy always aims to reduce type 1 supply to the protection
level pts,−, and type 2 supply to p
t
s,+. This result is generalizable to the case with β ∈ (0,1).
More specifically, consider the case with z1 > 0 and z2 > 0. In this case we match type 1 demand
with type 2 supply in round 2. According to the proposition, if type 1 demand is ample, the optimal
policy will reduce type 2 supply to z2∧pts,+ (i.e., to pts,+ if the quantity z2 of available type 2 supply
is above pts,+, or there is no matching if z2 is already no more than p
t
s,+). If there is a low level
of type 1 demand, however, type 2 supply can be reduced at most by z1 (when all available type
1 demand is matched with type 2 supply) to the level z2 − z1. The case of z1 < 0 and z2 < 0 is
symmetric to the case of z1 > 0 and z2 > 0.
5.2. Multiple demand types and supply types
We now study the more general case with m demand types and n supply types, all located in the
space C. Here we consider the case where C is a line segment, with its two endpoints denoted by
o and d, respectively. The fitness of matching a demand type i and a supply type j is determined
by the distance between i and j on C. We consider two distance metrics, but focus on the directed
distance in this subsection.
Undirected distance. This is the shortest distance between the location of i∈D and j ∈ S on C.
Directed distance. Suppose that C is endowed with a direction, say, from endpoint o to endpoint
d (in short, o→ d). If the location of i ∈D can be reached from the location of j ∈ S by traveling
along the given direction o→ d (i.e., i is located between j and endpoint d), the distance between
i and j, denoted by disti←j, is defined as the distance to be travelled by j along the given direction
o→ d to reach the location of i.
We now focus on the directed distance, and assume that the unit matching reward between i∈D
and j ∈ S is a linearly decreasing function of the distance disti←j if j can reach i by traveling along
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the direction o→ d, i.e., rtij = Rt − disti←j. If j cannot reach i by traveling along the direction
o→ d, the unit reward is rtij = 0.
It is clear that the optimal matching quantity qt∗ij = 0 if j cannot reach i along the direction
o→ d. Next, we compare two pairs of demand and supply, for both of which the supply type can
reach the demand type along the direction o→ d.
Lemma 1. (i) Suppose that supply type j can reach both i and i′ along the direction o→ d. Then,
(i, j)Ms (i′, j) if and only if along the direction o→ d, the distance from j to i is shorter than the
distance from j to i′.
(ii) Suppose that both supply types j and j′ can reach type i demand along the direction o→ d.
Then, (i, j)Ms (i, j′) if and only if along the direction o→ d, j is closer to i than j′.
Lemma 1 suggests that for two neighboring pairs of demand and supply, the pair with a shorter,
unidirectional distance should have a higher priority. It follows from this lemma that any two
neighboring pairs are comparable by Ms .
Proposition 6. (i) If disti←j < disti←j′, the optimal policy matches (i, j) before (i, j′). If
disti←j < disti′←j, the optimal policy matches (i, j) before (i′, j).
(ii) Suppose that Rt decreases in t. If there are no other demand or supply types located between
i∈D and j ∈ S on C, i and j should be matched with each other greedily, i.e., qt∗ij = min{xi, yj}.
Proposition 6 prescribes a priority hierarchy for the optimal matching policy, by classifying the
pairs of demand and supply into priority tiers. Let the set of tier 0 pairs, denoted by A0, be those
not dominated by any neighboring pair under Ms . Recursively, we can define tier k pairs, denoted
by Ak, as those pairs that belong to A\⋃k−1`=1 A` and are not dominated by any other neighboring
pairs in A\⋃k−1`=1 A`. Suppose that there are a total number of K tiers. The optimal policy always
matches the pairs in Ak−1 before it moves on to match the pairs in Ak, for k= 1, . . . ,K. Moreover,
if a pair (i, j)∈Ak−1 is not matched to the full extent (i.e., there are remaining quantities of both
type i demand and type j supply), any pair of the form (i′, j) or (i, j′) in A\⋃k−1`=1 A` will not be
matched (i.e., with a zero matching quantity) in the optimal policy.
A heuristic idea
Proposition 6 provides a partial characterization of the optimal policy with respect to the priority
structure, but does not prescribe how much to match for each pair of demand and supply types.
Motivated by this proposition, we briefly describe a heuristic idea to compute the optimal matching
decisions. For a given period t, we consider i ∈ D and j ∈ S both located on the line segment
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C such that i is accessible from j along the given direction. When matching i with j, we may
want to reserve some type i demand (resp., type j supply) for future supply types (resp., demand
types) located between i and j on the line segment C. But we may not want to reserve type i
demand (resp., type j supply) for any supply type j′ (resp. demand type i′) located outside the
segment between i and j, due to the lower priority of the pair (i, j′) (resp., (i′, j)) than the pair
(i, j) (see Proposition 6). As a heuristic, we determine the matching between i and j by considering
a subproblem P(i, j) that comprises only demand type i, supply type j and the types located
between i and j on C. According to Proposition 6, we should not match i with j until there is no
remaining quantity for any demand type i′ or supply type j′ located between i and j. Thus, we
assume that in the subproblem P(i, j), all types except demand type i and supply type j have zero
remaining quantity. Analogous to the 2× 2 model in Section 5.1, we can show that the optimal
matching between i and j is characterized by a protection level pt,IBij,d on type i demand and p
t,IB
ij,s on
type j supply, with both protection levels dependent on IB (which is the imbalance between type
i demand and type j supply) and pt,IBij,d − pt,IBij,s = IB. More specifically, we will match i with j until
type i demand is reduced to pt,IBij,d and type j supply is reduced to p
t,IB
ij,s , or as close as possible.
Next, we outline the heuristic matching procedure for a period t, assuming that the protection
levels pt,IBij,d and p
t,IB
ij,s are already obtained for all i∈D and j ∈ S.
Heuristic 1. (Prioritized matching for the horizontal model)
for k= 1 to K do
for each pair (i, j) in priority tier k do
Match i with j until type i demand is reduced to pt,IBij,d and type j supply is reduced to
pt,IBij,s , or as close as possible
end for
end for
Within each priority tier, it does not matter which pair we match first, because the matching of
one pair does not affect the subproblem for another pair within the same tier. The computation of
the protection levels for each subproblem P(i, j), however, remains challenging. In the appendix, we
discuss a heuristic method that converts the subproblem P(i, j) to a 2× 2 model by consolidating
demand and supply types. Next, we discuss a couple of applications of the horizontal model.
Commuter car pooling platforms
Carpooling platforms such as iCarpool and UberPool match a driver heading to a destination with
several riders to the same destination (or in the same direction). Commuting patterns of many
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cities indicate that drivers and riders often share the same destination. For example, Figure 3
displays the New York City commuting pattern in the mornings of weekdays, from which we see
that commuters travel from different suburban areas in the same direction to the city. In this case,
the directed line segment C is corresponding to the route that starts from a suburban area (i.e.,
endpoint o) and ends in the city (i.e., endpoint d). Drivers, who may be commuters themselves,
pick up riders along the route.
Figure 3 Commuting pattern in the mornings of weekdays, from suburban areas to NYC.
		 			 	
Note. Each colored dot represents a group of commuters on the same commuting route.
Moreover, if all riders share the same destination (e.g., the city) and a driver picks up riders
along the way to the destination, the closer a rider to the driver, the shorter the waiting time
for the rider and the higher the payment for the ride (due to the longer distance travelled by the
rider). To formalize this intuition, we generalize the reward function rtij =R
t− disti←j mentioned
above as follows. If j can reach i along the direction o→ d, the unit reward of matching i with j
is rtij =R
t
i − disti←j. Otherwise, rtij = 0. Here, Rti represents the reward resulting from the match
and is dependent on the attribute of type i demand, e.g., the travel distance of the rider (from
rider i’s initial location to the destination). The second term −disti←j represents the disutility
proportional to the traveling distance by the driver for the pickup, e.g., a longer distance implies a
longer roaming time for the driver and longer waiting time for the rider. Following similar analysis,
we can show that (i, j)Ms (i′, j) if and only if i is closer to j than i′ along the direction of the
route, and that (i, j)Ms (i, j′) if and only if j is closer to i than j′ along the direction of the route.
Product/Service general upgrading
Upgrading uses a high-class supply to fulfill a low-class demand, which is widely adopted in the
business practice, e.g., in travel industries (see, e.g., Yu et al. 2015) and in production/inventory set-
tings (see, e.g., Bassok et al. 1999). Figure 4 illustrates such a model that allows general upgrading
(see Yu et al. 2015). In this model, product classes 1, . . . , n are indexed according to the descend-
ing order of quality. Class i products are intended for the customer segment i. Thus it is mostly
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Figure 5 One-level upgrading.
desirable to satisfy a class i customer demand using a class i product, more desirable to satisfy a
class i demand using a class k product than using a class k− 1 product (1<k≤ i), and infeasible
to satisfy a class i demand using a class ` product (` > i).
In contrast to the existing works in the literature where the supply side is either fixed or controlled
through replenishing decisions, there are many settings in which new supply arrives randomly. For
example, ride-hailing platforms such as Uber randomly have new drivers coming online or existing
drivers completing a service and becoming available, who provide differentiated types of service
(UberX, UberSELECT, UberBLACK, etc.; a more premium vehicle can be used to serve a less
premium customer class through upgrading). Car rental companies may have random supply levels
due to early/late return of cars by customers. Airlines and hotels can also have random “arrival”
of supply due to customer cancellations.
The problem of general upgrading has the structure of a directed line segment in the product
line space. Class i demand and class i product share the same location on the line segment, and the
lower the class index, the closer the class is located to the endpoint o. For j ≤ i, let cj be the unit
purchase cost for class j product and f ti be the fare paid by class i customers in period t. The unit
profit for assigning i to j is then rtij = f
t
i −cj = f ti −ci− (cj−ci). If we define disti←j := cj−ci as the
distance between i and j and Rit := f
t
i − ci as the unit profit from a class i customer being satisfied
by a class i product, then the reward structure reduces to the one we have already considered in
the previous application, i.e., rtij = R
t
i − disti←j. Then the optimal policy will satisfy a customer
with a product class that is the same as or closer to the originally requested product, and assign a
product to a customer the same as or closer to the customer class that the product is intended for.
One-level product upgrading
Shumsky and Zhang (2009) study a capacity management problem in which each customer class
can only be upgraded one level higher. Figure 5 demonstrates the structure of such a problem.
Again, we can think of the customer classes and product classes located on a line segment C, where
the class j product and its intended customer class j share the same location.
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The infeasibility of upgrading with more than one level makes the problem structurally different
from the general upgrading problem. In the one-level-up upgrading problem, the reward structure
is the same as before for any i, j = i− 1, i.e., rti,i−1 = Rti − disti←i−1, with Rti decreasing in time.
But for any i, j 6= i− 1, rtij = 0, different from the general upgrading problem. As a result, in the
one-level-up upgrading problem, two neighboring pairs of demand and supply, (i, i) and (i, i− 1),
are not necessarily comparable under Ms . Specifically, rtii−rti,i−1 = disti←i−1−disti←i = disti←i−1,
and rti+1,i− rti+1,i−1 = rti+1,i =Rti−disti+1←i. Therefore, a necessary condition for (i, i)Ms (i, i−1)
is that Rti ≤ disti+1←i + disti←i−1 = disti+1←i−1, which may not be guaranteed in general.
The above argument implies that it may not be optimal to prioritize the matching between a
pair of demand and supply intended for each other (i.e., demand type i with supply type i), over
upgrading (i.e., demand type i with supply type i − 1, or demand type i + 1 with supply type
i), when the supply is random. In the followings, we investigate the loss of optimality caused by
enforcing the aforementioned priority structure.
Remark 2. Our priority structure for the general upgrading problem is consistent with Bassok
et al. (1999), who consider a single-period version of the problem with general upgrading. They
prove that greedy matching along the specified priority structure (i.e., a product-customer pair
has a higher priority if they are closer to each other) is optimal by showing that such a priority
structure leads to a classical Monge sequence. However, similar to our arguments above, there no
longer exits a Monge sequence when only one-level upgrading is allowed, even in the single-period
problem considered by Bassok et al. (1999).
Let P IOU be the set of matching policies that prioritizes intended pairs over upgrading. More
specifically, a policy belongs to P IOU if and only if it matches (i, i) greedily before (i, i−1) and (i+
1, i). That is, unless qtii = min{xi, yj}, the policy has qti,i−1 = qti+1,i = 0. In the following proposition,
we show that by enforcing the best policy in P IOU, the optimality loss is no more than 50%.
Proposition 7. Suppose that rtii ≥ max{α,β} rt+1ii for any i = 1, . . . , n and t = 1, . . . , T − 1.3
There exists a matching policy belonging to PIOU, such that it retains at least 50% of the total
expected reward under the optimal matching policy.
6. Vertically Differentiated Demand and Supply Types
In this section, we consider vertically differentiated demand and supply types. Each demand/supply
type is associated with a “quality” level, and generates a higher reward if it is matched with a supply
3 For time-dependent carry-over rates, we replace the condition rtii ≥max{α,β} rt+1ii with rtii ≥max{αt, βt} rt+1ii .
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or demand type of a higher quality. In other words, we have the reward function rtij = f
t(ai, bj)
increasing in ai and bj, where ai represents the quality of demand type i and bj represents the quality
of supply type j. For simplicity, we consider a linearly additive reward function rtij = f
t
d(ai)+f
t
s(bj),
where f td and f
t
s are increasing in ai and bj, respectively. We write r
t
id := f
t
d(ai) and r
t
js := f
t
s(bj).
Later we consider the generalization in which the reward structure can be nonlinear (see §6.4).
Without loss of generality, we assume that a demand/supply type with a smaller index has a
higher quality. That is, rt1d > r
t
2d > · · · > rtmd and rt1s > rt2s > · · · > rtns. In addition, we make the
following assumption, which requires the quality difference between types to weakly decrease in
time. For convenience of notation, we define rtm+1,d = r
t
n+1,s := 0 for all period t.
Assumption 3. For any t = 1, . . . , T − 1, i = 1, . . . ,m and j = 1, . . . , n, we assume that rtid −
rti+1,d ≥ α(rt+1id − rt+1i+1,d) and rtjs− rtj+1,s ≥ β(rt+1js − rt+1j+1,s).
Assumption 3 enables us to compare neighboring pairs of demand and supply under Ms .
Lemma 2. Under Assumption 3, (i, j)Ms (i, j′) for all j < j′, and (i, j)Ms (i′, j) for all i < i′.
It follows from Lemma 2 and Theorem 1 that a higher-quality supply type j will prioritize over a
lower-quality supply type j′ for matching with any demand type i. (Symmetrically, a higher-quality
demand type i will prioritize over a lower-quality demand type i′ for matching with any supply
type j.) Then if we line up demand types and supply types separately in ascending order of their
indices (i.e., descending order of their quality levels), the optimal policy will match demand with
supply from the top and down to some level (see Figure 6), referred to as “top-down” matching.
Figure 6 Line up, match up (to a “match-down-to” level).
		1	 	1	
		2	 	1	
		2	 	2	
		2	 	2	
		3	 	2	
		3	 	2	
		4	 	3	
		4	
Qt* 
Proposition 8. The top-down matching is optimal, and the optimal matching quantities in
period t are fully determined by the optimal total matching quantity Qt∗ :=
∑
i∈D,j∈S q
t∗
ij .
Remark 3. With the additive reward rtij = r
t
id+r
t
js, matching a unit of type i demand with any
supply type always contributes the reward rtid, regardless of which supply type it matches with.
Likewise, a unit of type j supply always contributes rtjs upon matching. Thus, the optimal decision
Qt∗ is not unique. As long as we determine the total quantity Qt∗ of demand and supply to match,
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the total matching reward is determined and independent of how we pair up the demand types
and supply types. Nevertheless, the top-down matching with higher quality types prioritized over
lower quality types offers a stable matching (see Roth and Sotomayor 1990) in terms of incentive
compatibility for each individual within the centrally determined matching pool of size Qt∗.
Like in the horizontal model, we can also view the optimal matching policy in the form of a
“match-down-to threshold” structure. For ease of notation, we define x˜i :=
∑i
k=1 xk for i= 1, . . . ,m
and y˜j :=
∑j
k=1 yk for j = 1, . . . , n (with x˜0 := 0 and y˜0 := 0) as the transformed system state. (See
Online Appendix E for an alternative formulation of the vertical model based on the transformed
state (x˜, y˜) := (x˜1, . . . , x˜m, y˜1, . . . , y˜n).) Under the top-down matching, type i demand is matched
with type j supply only when y˜j > x˜i−1 and y˜j−1 < x˜i.4 When type i demand matches with type
j supply, there exist state-dependent protection levels pti,d and p
t
j,s such that by matching i and j,
the optimal policy reduces type i demand to pti,d and type j supply to p
t
j,s, or as close as possible.
5
The optimal total matching quantity Qt∗ (or the protection levels) is state-dependent and chal-
lenging to compute due to the high dimensionality of the problem. Next, we propose a heuristic
method to determine the matching decisions in each period, and also explore the structural prop-
erties of the optimal total quantity Qt∗ with respect to the state (x,y) for two special cases.
6.1. The one-step-ahead policy
Let the greedy policy be defined as one that retains the top-down structure and matches demand
with supply as much as possible in every period. We consider the following one-step-ahead policy,
which improves on the greedy policy. Under this policy, the intermediary assumes in every period t
that from the next period t+1 until the end of the time horizon the greedy policy will be enforced.
(In the next period t+ 1, however, instead of using the greedy decisions the policy will use the
“optimal” policy that maximizes the total expected reward-to-go, provided that greedy matching
is enforced from period t+ 2 to the end of the horizon.)
It is well-known that high dimensional dynamic programs are extremely hard to solve due to the
difficulty in evaluating the value functions. The one-step-ahead policy provides an easy-to-compute
approximation to the optimal value function (i.e., the optimal reward that can be received from the
next period to the end of the horizon). Consider period t+ 1 with state (x,y). For any realization
ω[t+1,T ] of demand and supply of each type from period t+ 1 to period T , we can calculate the
total reward received under the greedy policy (denoted by R[t+1,T ](x,y, ω[t+1,T ])). We randomly
4 If y˜j ≤ x˜i−1, type j supply has been fully consumed when the optimal policy starts to match type i demand. Likewise,
if y˜j−1 ≥ x˜i, type i demand is fully consumed before the optimal policy starts to match type j supply.
5 Both pti,d and p
t
j,s depend on x˜i− y˜j , x˜i, . . . , x˜m, and y˜j , . . . , y˜n. We suppress the dependency for ease of notation.
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draw N samples ω
[t+1,T ]
1 , . . . , ω
[t+1,T ]
N , and approximate the optimal value function by Vt+1(x,y)≈
1
N
∑N
k=1R
[t+1,T ](x,y, ω
[t+1,T ]
k ). Based on this approximation, we can solve the total expected reward
maximization problem in period t, and use its solution to approximate the optimal total matching
quantity in period t. More technical details on the one-step-ahead policy are in Appendix F. Since
the one-step-ahead policy improves upon the greedy policy, naturally we have the following:
Proposition 9. The one-step-ahead policy has a higher expected reward than the greedy policy.
6.2. Patient demand and supply types
Consider the case with α = β = 1, in which all demand types and supply types are infinitely
patient. (The results hold for the case with equal carry-over rates, α= β ∈ (0,1), with more com-
plicated notation.) We study the monotonicity properties of the optimal total matching quantity
Qt∗ with respect to the state (x,y). We write Qt∗ as Qt∗(x,y) to reflect its dependency on the
state (x,y). We also define ∂Q
t∗(x,y)
∂xi
:= lim supε→0+[Q
t∗(x + εei,y)−Qt∗(x,y)]/ε and ∂Q
t∗(x,y)
∂yj
:=
limsupε→0+[Q
t∗(x,y + εej)−Qt∗(x,y)]/ε if Qt∗ is not differentiable.
Proposition 10. The optimal total matching quantity Qt∗(x,y) is increasing in the demand
level xi and supply level yj for all i ∈ D and j ∈ S, with the increasing rate no greater than one,
i.e., 0 ≤ ∂Qt∗(x,y)
∂xi
≤ 1 and 0 ≤ ∂Qt∗(x,y)
∂yj
≤ 1 for all i ∈ D and j ∈ S. Moreover, Qt∗(x,y) is more
sensitive to demand and supply types of higher quality, i.e., ∂Q
t∗(x,y)
∂xi
≥ ∂Qt∗(x,y)
∂xi+1
for i= 1, . . . ,m−1
and ∂Q
t∗(x,y)
∂yj
≥ ∂Qt∗(x,y)
∂yj+1
for j = 1, . . . , n− 1.
The one-step-ahead policy. With additive rewards, a unit of type i demand always gener-
ates the reward rtid in period t regardless of which supply type it pairs with. Similarly, a unit
of type i demand always generates the reward rtjs in period t. Therefore, it may be less crucial
which demand/supply types we withhold for future supply/demand, but more important how much
demand/supply we withhold. When we match type i demand with type j supply, the trade-off is
between receiving the unit matching reward rtij in the current period t, and withholding type i
demand (or type j supply) for some future supply j′ < j (or some future demand i′ < i) so that
the latter will not be delayed in getting paired or be lost in the case of α= β < 1. Intuitively, the
amount of demand/supply we want to withhold is determined by the imbalance between demand
and supply, e.g., the more demand (supply) in excess of supply (demand), the less supply (demand)
we want to withhold. This intuition is shown to hold for the one-step-ahead policy.
Under the one-step-ahead policy, we show that the matching decision in each period can be
described in terms of protection levels which only depend on the aggregate imbalance between
demand and supply, when both demand and supply are patient.
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Let IB := x˜m− y˜n be the aggregate imbalance between demand and supply.
Proposition 11. For any i ∈ D, j ∈ S and t= 1, . . . , T , there exist protection levels pt,IBij,d and
pt,IBij,s dependent on IB such that p
t,IB
ij,d − pt,IBij,s = x˜m− y˜n, and that in period t:
(i) The one-step-ahead policy matches i and j only if x˜i > y˜j−1 and y˜j > x˜i−1;
(ii) When the one-step-ahead policy matches i and j, it aims to reduce the total available demand
to the protection level pt,IBij,d and the total available supply to p
t,IB
ij,s or as close as possible.
(iii) pt,IBij,d is increasing in IB with the increasing rate no greater than 1, and p
t,IB
ij,s is decreasing
in IB with the decreasing rate no greater than 1.
Proposition 11 shows that the one-step-ahead policy has limited state-dependency. Instead of
depending on the full state (x,y), the protection levels pt,IBij,d and p
t,IB
ij,s only depend on the aggregate
imbalance IB between demand and supply.
As indicated by part (i) of Proposition 11, type i demand is matched with type j supply only
when x˜i > y˜j−1 (in which case type i demand is not fully consumed by types 1, . . . , j− 1 demand)
and y˜j > x˜i−1 (in which case type j supply is not fully consumed by types 1, . . . , i− 1 demand).
Under the top-down matching, type i demand (or type j supply) would never be used unless
all higher-quality demand types (or supply types) have run out. Thus, immediately prior to the
matching between i and j, a total quantity x˜i−1∨ y˜j−1 := max{x˜i−1, y˜j−1} of demand and the same
quantity of supply have been consumed. There is a total quantity x˜m − x˜i−1 ∨ y˜j−1 of remaining
demand and a total quantity y˜n− x˜i−1 ∨ y˜j−1 of remaining supply.
As we match along the top-down structure in period t, type i demand and type j supply would
be matched to the maximum extent when the total quantity reaches x˜i ∧ y˜i := min{x˜i, y˜i} (in that
case, either type i demand or type j supply runs out). This happens when the aggregate demand
level reduces to x˜m− x˜i ∧ y˜j, or equivalently, the aggregate supply level reduces to y˜n− x˜i ∧ y˜j.
Overall, the one-step-ahead policy matches i with j in the following intuitive way:
• If x˜m− x˜i−1∨ y˜j−1 is below pt,IBij,d (or equivalently, y˜n− x˜i−1∨ y˜j−1 is below pt,IBij,s ), the aggregate
demand level (or aggregate supply level) is already below the target level before i matches with j.
The one-step-ahead policy will not match i and j, and neither any demand/supply of lower quality.
• If pt,IBij,d ≤ x˜m − x˜i ∧ y˜j (or equivalently pt,IBij,s ≤ y˜n − x˜i ∧ y˜j), either type i demand is depleted
before total demand reduces to pt,IBij,d or type j supply is depleted before total supply reduces to
pt,IBij,s . The one-step-ahead policy will match i with j to the full extent.
• If x˜m− x˜i ∧ y˜j < pt,IBij,d ≤ x˜m− x˜i−1 ∨ y˜j−1 and y˜n− x˜i ∧ y˜j < pt,IBij,s ≤ y˜n− x˜i−1 ∨ y˜j−1, the policy
matches i and j until the total demand reduces to pt,IBij,d and total supply to p
t,IB
ij,s .
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6.3. Impatient demand and patient supply
Consider the case with α = 0 and β = 1, in which unmatched demand is lost at the end of each
period and unmatched supply is fully carried to the next period. (The results hold for the case
with an arbitrary supply carry-over rate β ∈ (0,1).) Since demand does not carry over to the next
period, we do not have the demand state x in the dynamic program and the optimal policy does
not depend on x. Following similar analysis, we can show that Proposition 10 remains true.
6.4. Non-additive reward structure
Our results can be generalized to account for non-additive reward structures. Instead of adopting
the reward function rtij = r
t
id + r
t
js, we consider the following assumption.
Assumption 4. (i) The unit matching reward rtij is decreasing in i and j;
(ii) For i= 1, . . . ,m− 1 and j = 1, . . . , n− 1, rtij − rti+1,j ≥ α(rt+1ij′′ − rt+1i+1,j′′) holds for all j′′ ∈ S
and rtij − rti,j+1 ≥ β(rt+1i′′j − rt+1i′′,j+1) holds for all i′′ ∈D;
(iii) rtij is supermodular with respect to i and j, i.e., r
t
ij−rti,j+1 ≥ rti+1,j−rti+1,j+1 for i= 1, . . . ,m−
1 and j = 1, . . . , n− 1.
Under Assumption 4, Propositions 8 and 10 remain true.
In particular, part (i) of Assumption 4 suggests that a demand/supply type with a smaller index
has a higher quality level. Part (ii) generalizes Assumption 3 and says that the quality difference
between a high type demand (supply) and a low type demand (supply) is decreasing over time.
Part (iii) of Assumption 4 further ensures the condition (2) in Definition 2. By Theorem 1, there is
an optimal policy that respectsMs. Thus, a high-quality demand/supply type has higher priority
over a lower-quality type in such a policy. Consequently, Proposition 8 holds under Assumption 4.
Following similar analysis (see the proof of Proposition 10 in Appendix A), we can show that
under Assumption 4 (i)–(iii), Proposition 10 remains true for both the case with patient demand
and supply and the case with patient supply but impatient demand.
To illustrate the conditions in Assumption 4, we consider the reward structure rtij = a
t
i+b
t
j+γa
t
ib
t
j.
Parts (i) and (iii) of the assumption is satisfied when ati decreases in i and b
t
j decreases in j. One
can verify that part (ii) is satisfied if and only if:
min
i,i′∈D
1 + γati
1 + γati′
≥ β · b
t+1
j − bt+1j+1
btj − btj+1
and min
j,j′∈S
1 + γbtj
1 + γbtj′
≥ α · a
t+1
i − at+1i+1
ati− ati+1
.
The above conditions are met if both β · b
t+1
j
−bt+1
j+1
bt
j
−bt
j+1
and α · a
t+1
i
−at+1
i+1
at
i
−at
i+1
are smaller than 1, and the
parameter γ is sufficiently small (i.e., the additive component of the reward is sufficiently more
significant than the multiplicative component).
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7. Conclusion
We consider a stochastic and dynamic matching framework with heterogeneous demand and sup-
ply types in the discrete-time setting. We generalize the Monge sequence to establish conditions
(which we call the (weak) modified Monge conditions) to prioritize demand-supply pairs optimally.
Two reward structures satisfy the modified Monge condition for all neighboring pairs. In the unidi-
rectionally horizontal reward structure, “distance” determines priority, and in the vertical reward
structure, “quality” determines priority. Under both reward structures, the optimal matching pro-
ceeds along the priority structure, and when it comes to the matching between a specific pair,
the optimal policy has a match-down-to threshold structure. This structural property of “priority
and thresholds” is a generalization of priority structures seen in the balanced and deterministic
transportation problems, and the threshold-type policies seen in the inventory management (such
as base-stock levels) and quantity-based revenue management (such as protection levels).
The proposed framework generalizes many classic problems. For example, we generalize inven-
tory rationing problems and dynamic capacity allocation models with upgrading, by allowing for
multiple exogenous supply streams and arbitrary substitution. It also lays out a foundation for
further research in the area of dynamic matching at the operational level. For example, one can
consider joint pricing and matching decisions and competition among platforms.
Appendix
Weak compatibility
Definition 4. (Weak Compatibility) We say that an optimal matching policy {Qt}t=1,...,T weakly
respects M, if (i) for all (i, j)M (i′, j) and all t= 1, . . . , T , either qti′j = 0 or uti = 0; (ii) for all (i, j)M (i, j′)
and all t= 1, . . . , T , either qtij′ = 0 or v
t
j = 0.
If a policy weakly respects M, then under this policy, a dominant pair of demand and supply types has
higher “priority” than a dominated pair (with the dominance relation determined by M) in the following
sense: If (i, j) M (i′, j), unless there is no remaining type i demand (i.e., uti = 0; in other words, it is
impossible to further match i with j), the optimal policy would not match type i′ demand with type j supply.
We can verify that the weak compatibility can be inferred by the compatibility defined in Definition 3.
The following result studies the structure of the optimal policy when only the weak modified Monge
condition is satisfied.
Theorem 2. There exists an optimal matching policy that weakly respects M.
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Even though Theorem 2 suggests that the optimal policy would not match (i′, j) unless type i demand
runs out (provided that (i, j)M (i′, j)), it does not necessarily mean that a dominant pair should always
be matched before a dominated pair; see the following example.
Example 1. Suppose that (i, j)M (i′, j) and (i, j)M (i, j′). In period t, with the state (x,y) such that
xi = yj = 1, the matching quantities q
t∗
ij = 0, q
t∗
i′j = q
t∗
ij′ = 1 can be optimal and weakly respect M, consistent
with Theorem 2. (With qt∗i′j = q
t∗
ij′ = 1, there is no remaining type i demand or type j supply.) However, the
matching over (i, j) is not prioritized over (i′, j) and (i, j′). 
In contrast, the partial relation Ms strengthens M to provide a sufficient condition that indeed ensures
that a dominant pair is prioritized over a dominated pair in the optimal matching policy (Theorem 1).
Remark 4. The partial relation M is not only sufficient but also robustly necessary for Theorem 2.
That is, if the conditions associated with M are not satisfied, one can construct an instance of demand and
supply distributions such that the optimal policy does not satisfy the property in Definition 4. Likewise, the
partial relation Ms is robustly necessary for Theorem 1.
Proof of Remark 4. To see the first claim, we show that there exists an instance in which the statement
“either qtij′ = 0 or u
t
j = 0” does not hold under the optimal policy, in either of the following situations: (i)
rtij < r
t
ij′ ; (ii) r
t
ij − rtij′ <β(rt+1i′′j − rt+1i′′j′) for some i′′ ∈D.
For i), we consider the state with xi = 1, yj = yj′ = 1 and xi′′′ = yj′′′ = 0 for all other i
′′′ ∈D and j′′′ ∈ S in
period t. Moreover, there is no new arrival of demand or supply from period t to the end of the time horizon.
In this case, the problem reduces to a single-period problem. Given that rtij < r
t
ij′ , it is optimal to set q
t
ij = 0
and qtij′ = 1 in period t. Since v
t
j = 1> 0 under those matching quantities, the statement does not hold.
For ii), we again consider the state with xi = 1, yj = yj′ = 1 and xi′′′ = yj′′′ = 0 for all other i
′′′ ∈ D and
j′′′ ∈ S in period t. In period t+ 1, 1 unit of type i′′ demand arrives. Other than that, there is no new arrival
from period t to the end of time horizon. The problem reduces to a two-period (i.e., period t and period
t+ 1) deterministic problem. We either match i with j in period t and match i′′ with j′ in period t+ 1 (note
that quantity β of type j′ supply carries over to period t+ 1), or match i with j′ in period t and match i′′
with j in period t+ 1. Since rtij− rtij′ <β(rt+1i′′j − rt+1i′′j′), the latter option leads to a higher total reward. Thus
under the optimal policy, qtij′ = 1> 0 and v
t
j = 1> 0, implying that the statement does not hold.
To see the second claim, suppose that rtij + r
t
i′j′ ≥ rti′j + rtij′ does not hold for some (i, j) M (i, j′) and
(i, j)M. Consider the state with xi = yj = xi′ = yj′ = 1 in period t, and there is no new arrival of demand
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or supply from period t to the end of the time horizon. Then, the optimal decision in period t is to match i
with j′ for 1 unit and match i′ with j for 1 unit, which does not prioritize (i, j) over (i′, j) or (i, j′). 
The weaker partial order M requires less on the reward structure than Ms . But the stronger partial
order Ms guarantees more, i.e., the optimal policy satisfies a priority hierarchy which can turn matching
into a sequential procedure based on the partial order. In the paper, we have focused on problems in which
the reward structure indeed leads to the strong partial relationMs and obtain the optimal priority matching
structure. But even if we only have the weak partial order M (i.e., the additional condition (2) is not
satisfied), we may adopt, the best policy within the sequential procedure based on the partial order, as
a heuristic. In Online Appendix B, we show that any policy that weakly respects a partial order is only
different from another policy that respects the same partial order by a single-period transportation problem.
Computation of protection levels in Heuristic 1
We consolidate all demand types i′ 6= i into a single artificial demand type ic, and all supply types j′ 6= j into
a single artificial supply type jc. See Figure 7 for a demonstration.
j 
i 
j1' 
j2' 
j3' 
i3' 
i2' 
i1' 
jc 
ic 
Figure 7 Consolidation of types.
Since each pair (i, j′) has a higher priority than (i, j) and so does each pair (i′, j), both (i, jc) and (ic, j)
are prioritized over (i, j). While the total demand of all type i′(6= i) demand combined is ∑i′ 6=iDτi′ in period
τ , only part of the amount are available for supply type j. This is because a supply type j′′ located between
i and j on the line segment C has a higher priority than j in matching with some i′, and thus may consume
some of type i′ demand. Likewise, the combined demand of all type j′ supply may not be fully available for
type i demand. Next, we define the “effective” demand of type ic and “effective” supply of type jc.
For a period τ (t≤ τ ≤ T ), let type i′ demand be realized as dτi′ and type j′ supply be realized as sj′ , for
all types i′ and j′ involved in the subproblem P(i, j). We also assume that those are all the available demand
and supply in period τ , for i′ 6= i and j′ 6= j. The pair (i, j) has the lowest priory among all other pairs in
the subproblem P(i, j), because the distance between i and j is longer than the distance between any other
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pair. We perform greedy matching on the subproblem in period τ according to the distance-based priority
structure, but terminate right before matching i with j. We consider the remaining demand and supply,
denoted by d˜τi′ and s˜
τ
j′ (i
′ 6= i, j′ 6= j), as the type i′ demand and type j′ supply available to match with type
j supply and type i demand, respectively. We let D˜τi′ and S˜
τ
j′ be the corresponding random variables to the
realizations d˜τi′ and s˜
τ
j′ , respectively. Although it is difficult to derive the exact distributions of those random
variables, we may sample a number of realizations and fit the distributions of D˜τi′ and S˜
τ
j′ accordingly.
We then consolidate all the demand type i′ 6= i as a single demand type ic and all the supply type j′ 6= j
as a single supply type jc. In each period τ (t ≤ τ ≤ T ), let Dτic :=
∑
i′ 6=i D˜
τ
i′ be the quantity of type i
c
demand to arrive in period τ , and Sτjc :=
∑
j′ 6=j S˜
τ
j′ the quantity of type j
c supply to arrive in period τ . We
assume that the unit matching reward between i and the artificial state jc is a weighted average among
all of the state j′ 6= j being consolidated, and the same for the unit matching reward between ic and j.
More specifically, we define the unit rewards r˜ij between the four types, i, i
c, j, jc, as follows. Let r˜τij := r
τ
ij ,
r˜τijc := [
∑
j′ 6=j r
τ
ij′ES˜
τ
j′ ]/ESjc , r˜
τ
icj := [
∑
i′ 6=i r
τ
i′jED˜
τ
i′ ]/EDic and r˜
τ
icjc := 0. We can readily verify that i and
jc are perfect matches for each other, and so are ic and j. The subproblem P(i, j) then reduces to a 2× 2
model, from which we can obtain the protection levels.
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1Online Appendices to “Dynamic Type Matching”
A. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2. To prove Theorem 2, we need two lemmas.
Lemma A.1. The following statements hold for all periods.
(i) For any xi > 0 and any ε ∈ [0, xi], there exists (λτ1 , . . . , λτm) ≥ 0 for τ = t, . . . , T , such that∑T
τ=tα
−(τ−t)∑m
j′=1 λ
τ
j′ ≤ ε and Vt(x− εeni + εeni′ ,y)−Vt(x,y)≥−
∑T
τ=t
∑m
j′=1 λ
τ
j′(r
τ
ij′ − rτi′j′).
(ii) For any yj > 0 and any ε ∈ [0, yj], there exists (ξτ1 , . . . , ξτn) ≥ 0 for τ = t, . . . , T , such that∑T
τ=t β
−(τ−t)∑n
i′=1 ξ
τ
i′ ≤ ε and Vt(x,y− εemj + εemj′ )−Vt(x,y)≥−
∑T
τ=t
∑n
i′=1 ξ
τ
i′(r
τ
i′j − rτi′j′).
Proof of Lemma A.1. We only need to prove part (i) The proof of part (ii) is symmetric to part
(i)
The proof is based on induction. The result holds for t= T + 1. Because VT+1(x,y)≡ 0, we can
simply set λTj to zero. Suppose that it holds for period t+ 1.
Now consider period t. Let Qˆ ∈ arg maxQHt(Q,x,y) be an optimal decision in period t under
the state (x,y) in period t. We will construct a decision Q¯ that is feasible under the state (x−
εeni + εe
n
i′ ,y).
Under the new state (x− εeni + εeni′ ,y), the capacity of i is reduced by ε compared with the
original state (x,y). We need to adjust the matching decision Qˆ accordingly to make it feasible
for the new state. In particular, we reduce the matching quantity qˆij by µj for j = 1, . . . , n, where
the nonnegative numbers µ1, . . . , µn are defined as follows.
µj =min{qˆij, (ε−
j−1∑
j′=1
qˆij′)
+}, for j = 1, . . . , n.
If
∑k−1
j′=1 qˆij′ < ε≤
∑k
j′=1 qˆij′ for some 1≤ k≤ n, then one can verify that µj = qˆij for j = 1, . . . , k−1,
µk = ε−∑kj′=1 qˆij′ and µj = 0 for j = k+1, . . . , n. In this case,∑nj=1 µj = ε, and thus∑nj=1(qˆij−µj) =∑n
j=1 qˆij −
∑n
j=1 µj =
∑n
j=1 qˆij − ε≤ xi− ε.
If ε >
∑n
j′=1 qˆij′ , then µj = qˆij for all j = 1, . . . , n. Therefore, we reduce the matching quantity qˆij
starting from j = 1, until either a total reduction ε is reached or all quantities qˆij (j = 1, . . . , n) are
reduced to 0. In this case,
∑n
j=1(qˆij −µj) = 0≤ xi− ε.
On the other hand, under the new state (x− εeni + εeni′ ,y), the capacity of i′ is increased by ε.
This allows us to increase the matching quantity qˆi′j by µj for all j = 1, . . . , n.
We define
2Q¯ = Qˆ−
n∑
j=1
µje
m×n
ij +
n∑
j=1
µje
m×n
i′j ,
which is feasible for the state (x− εeni + εeni′ ,y). To see this, we have
1mQ¯ =1mQˆ−
n∑
j=1
µj1me
m×n
ij +
n∑
j=1
µj1me
m×n
i′j = 1mQˆ−
n∑
j=1
µje
n
j +
n∑
j=1
µje
n
j = 1mQˆ≤ y.
Also,
Q¯1Tn =Qˆ1
T
n−
n∑
j=1
µje
m×n
ij 1
T
n +
n∑
j=1
µje
m×n
i′j 1
T
n = Qˆ1
T
n−
n∑
j=1
µj(e
m
i )
T +
n∑
j=1
µj(e
m
i′ )
T.
It follows that (Q¯1Tn)i =
∑n
j=1 qˆij−
∑n
j=1 µj ≤ xi− ε, (Q¯1Tn)i′ =
∑n
j=1 qˆi′j +
∑n
j=1 µj ≤
∑n
j=1 qˆi′j + ε≤
xi′ + ε and (Q¯1
T
n)i′′ =
∑n
j=1 qˆi′′j ≤ xi′′ for all i′′ 6= i, i′. Thus, Q¯1Tn ≤ (x− εeni + εeni′)T.
Therefore, Q¯ is a feasible decision for the state (x−εeni +εeni′ ,y). Under the decision x¯, the total
reward received in period t is
Rt ◦ Q¯ = Rt ◦ (Qˆ−
n∑
j=1
µje
m×n
ij +
n∑
j=1
µje
m×n
i′j ) = R
t ◦ Qˆ−
n∑
j=1
µjr
t
ij +
n∑
j=1
µjr
t
i′j.
The post-matching levels in period t are
u¯ =x− εemi + εemi′ −1nQ¯T
=x− εemi + εemi′ −1nQˆT +
n∑
j=1
µje
m
i −
n∑
j=1
µje
m
i′
=uˆ− (ε−
n∑
j=1
µj)e
m
i + (ε−
n∑
j=1
µj)e
m
i′ ,
v¯ =y−1mQ¯ = y−1mQˆ = vˆ.
Consequently,
Vt(x− εeni + εeni′ ,y)−Vt(x,y)
≥Ht(Q¯,x− εeni + εeni′ ,y)−Ht(Qˆ,x,y)
=−
n∑
j=1
µj(r
t
ij − rti′j)
+EVt+1(αuˆ−α(ε−
n∑
j=1
µj)e
m
i +α(ε−
n∑
j=1
µj)e
m
i′ + D
t+1, βvˆ + St+1)−EVt+1(αuˆ + Dt+1, βvˆ + St+1).
By the induction hypothesis, for each realization of Dt+1 and St+1, there exists (Λτ1 , . . . ,Λ
τ
n) for
3τ = t+ 1, . . . , T such that
∑T
τ=t+1α
−(τ−t−1)∑n
j=1 Λ
τ
j ≤ α(ε−
∑n
j=1 µj) and
Vt+1(αuˆ−α(ε−
n∑
j=1
µj)e
m
i +α(ε−
n∑
j=1
µj)e
m
i′ + D
t+1, βvˆ + St+1)−Vt+1(αuˆ + Dt+1, βvˆ + St+1)
≥−
T∑
τ=t+1
n∑
j=1
Λτj (r
τ
ij − rτi′j).
Note that Λτj is a random variable due to its possible dependency on the random vectors D
t+1
and St+1.
It then follows that
Vt(x− εeni + εeni′ ,y)−Vt(x,y)≥−
n∑
j=1
µj(r
t
ij − rti′j)−
T∑
τ=t+1
n∑
j=1
EΛτj · (rτij − rτi′j).
Since
∑T
τ=t+1α
−(τ−t−1)∑n
j=1 Λ
τ
j ≤ α(ε−
∑n
j=1 µj), we have
∑n
j=1 µj +
∑T
τ=t+1α
−(τ−t)∑n
j=1 Λ
τ
j ≤ ε.
Let λtj = µj for all j = 1, . . . , n, and λ
τ
j =EΛ
τ
j for all j = 1, . . . , n and τ = t+ 1, . . . , T . The proof of
the lemma is then completed. 
Lemma A.2. (i) Suppose that (i, j)M (i′, j). Then, transferring matching quantity from (i′, j)
to (i, j) weakly improves the total expected reward, i.e., Ht(Q+εe
m×n
ij −εem×ni′j ,x,y)≥Ht(Q,x,y),
if Q + εem×nij − εem×ni′j is a feasible decision under the state (x,y).
(ii) Similarly, if (i, j)M (i, j′), then Ht(Q + εem×nij − εem×nij′ ,x,y)≥Ht(Q,x,y).
Proof of Lemma A.2. We prove part (i) only since part (ii) can be proved analogously. The
post-matching levels for using Q + εem×nij − εem×nij′ are
u¯ =x−1n(Q + εem×nij − εem×ni′j )T = x−1nQ− εemi + εemi′ = u− εemi + εemi′ ,
v¯ =y−1m(Q + εem×nij − εem×ni′j ) = y−1mQ = v,
where (u,v) are the post-matching levels by using the decision Q in period t. Then,
Ht(Q + εe
m×n
ij − εem×nij′ ,x,y)−Ht(Q,x,y)
=ε(rtij − rtij′) +EVt+1(αu¯ + Dt+1, βv¯ + St+1)−EVt+1(αu + Dt+1, βv + St+1). (A.1)
By Lemma A.1, there exists (Λτ1 , . . . ,Λ
τ
n) for τ = t + 1, . . . , T such that∑T
τ=t+1α
−(τ−t−1)∑n
j′=1 Λ
τ
j′ ≤ αε and
4Vt+1(αu¯ + D
t+1, βv¯ + St+1)−Vt+1(αu + Dt+1, βv + St+1)≥−
T∑
τ=t+1
n∑
j′=1
Λτj′(r
τ
ij′ − rτi′j′).
Note that Λτj is a random variable since it may depend on D
t+1 and St+1.
(i, j)M (i′, j) implies that rτij′−rτi′j′ ≤ α−(τ−t)(rtij−rti′j) for all j′ ∈ S and τ = t+1, . . . , T . Thus,
Vt+1(αu¯ + D
t+1, βv¯ + St+1)−Vt+1(αu + Dt+1, βv + St+1)
≥−
T∑
τ=t+1
n∑
j′=1
Λτj′(r
τ
ij′ − rτi′j′)
≥− (rtij′ − rti′j′)
T∑
τ=t+1
α−(τ−t−1)
n∑
j′=1
Λτj′
≥− 1
α
(rtij − rti′j)×αε
=− (rtij − rti′j)ε. (A.2)
Combining (A.1) and (A.2), we have Ht(Q + εe
m×n
ij − εem×nij′ ,x,y)≥Ht(Q,x,y). 
We now proceed to prove Theorem 2.
Let Q∗ be an optimal decision in period t under the state (x,y). Suppose that Q∗ does not
satisfy the desired. For (i, j)M (i′, j), we will transfer a quantity ε := min
¶
qt∗i′j, u
t∗
i
©
from (i′, j)
to (i, j) if both qt∗i′j and u
t∗
i are positive. Similarly, for (i, j)M (i, j′), we will transfer a quantity
ε := min
¶
qt∗ij′ , v
t∗
j
©
from (i, j′) to (i, j) if both qt∗ij′ and v
t∗
j are positive. If multiple transfers are
possible, we choose the one that yields the greatest transferring quantity first.
After each transfer, we obtain a different matching decision that is feasible and weak dominates
Q∗ according to Lemma A.2. Let Qk be the matching decision after k transfers. Then, Qk is also
optimal since it weakly dominates the optimal decision Q∗ Since the transfers are unidirectional
(i.e., from a dominated pair of demand and supply to a dominant one), either the transferring
procedure ends in finite steps (say, in K steps) or the quantity transferred converges to zero. In the
former case, we obtain an optimal decision QK that satisfies the desired properties. In the latter
case, Qk converges to an optimal decision QK that satisfies the desired properties. 
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof is analogous to Theorem 2. In addition to the transfers we
considered in the proof of Theorem 2, we also consider the following type of transfers.
Let Qk be a feasible decision in period t under the state (§, †), and (u,v) be the corresponding
post-matching levels. Consider (i, j), (i′, j) and (i, j′) such that (i, j)Ms (i′, j) and (i, j)Ms (i, j′).
If both qt∗i′j and q
t∗
ij′ are positive, we construct another feasible decision Q
k+1 := Qk + εem×nij +
εem×nij − εem×ni′j − εem×nij′ , where ε := min
¶
qt∗i′j, q
t∗
ij′
©
.
5By repeatedly applying the transfers (as we did in the proof of Theorem 2), we eventually reaches
a feasible decision Q either in finite steps or in the limit, with the following properties:
(i) For (i, j)Ms (i′, j), either qti′j = 0 or uti = 0.
(ii) For (i, j)Ms (i, j′), either qtij′ = 0 or vtj = 0.
(iii) For (i, j)Ms (i, j′) and (i, j)Ms (i′, j), either qti′j = 0 or qtij′ = 0.
We now show that the above properties lead to the corollary. Suppose to the contrary that
qti′j > 0 and a
t
i > 0 for some (i, j)Ms (i′, j). According to property (i) above, uti = 0, which implies
that xi −∑j′′:(i,j′′)∈Bij,L qtij′′ −∑j′′:(i,j′′)/∈Bij,L qtij′′ = 0. By the definition of ati, we know that xi −∑
j′′:(i,j′′)/∈Bij,L q
t
ij′′ > 0. It follows that
∑
j′′:(i,j′′)∈Bij,L q
t
ij′′ . This further implies that there exists (i, j
′)
such that (i, j)Ms (i, j′) and qtij′ > 0. However, this contradicts property (iii) Thus, either qti′j = 0
and ati = 0 if (i, j)Ms (i′, j).
Similarly, we can show that either qtij′ = 0 and b
t
j = 0 if (i, j)Ms (i, j′).
Finally, if we started with an optimal decision, Q is also optimal since it weakly dominates the
initial optimal decision. 
Proof of Proposition 2. We show that greedy matching between i and j is optimal by induction.
It is easy to verify that greedy matching between i and j is optimal in the final period T . Suppose
that it is also optimal in period t+ 1.
Let Q be an optimal decision in period t under the state (x,y). Suppose that qij <min{xi, yj}.
We first show that by using Q both the post-matching levels uti and v
t
j are positive if (i, j)
dominates all its neighboring pairs by Ms . To prove that, let us suppose to the contrary that
uti = 0. Since qij <xi, there is a pair (i, j
′) such that qij′ > 0. Following Theorem 1, we have btj = 0.
According to the definition of btj, we have v
t
j ≤ btj = 0, implying that vtj = 0. However, vtj = 0 but
qij < yj implies that there is some (i
′, j) such that qi′j > 0. Consequently, btj ≥ vtj + qi′j > 0, which
contradicts btj = 0. Similarly, we can show that v
t
i = 0 also leads to contradiction. Thus, both u
t
i
and vtj are positive.
We now show that increasing the matching quantity between i and j by ε := min
¶
uti, v
t
j
©
does
not hurt the optimality of Q. Increasing the matching quantity between i and j by ε will increase
the matching reward in period t by rtijε, but decrease both the post-matching levels of i and j by
ε. In other words, we have
Ht(Q + εe
m×n
ij ,x,y)−Ht(Q + εem×nij ,x,y)
=rtijε+EVt+1(αu
t−αεemi + Dt+1, βvt−βεenj + St+1)−EVt+1(αut + Dt+1, βvt + St+1).
6Let us consider the case β ≥ α without loss of generality. We have
Vt+1(αu
t + Dt+1−αεemi , βvt + St+1−βεenj ) =Vt+1(αut + Dt+1 + (β−α)εemi , βvt + St+1)−βεrt+1ij
≥Vt+1(αut + Dt+1, βvt + St+1)−βεrt+1ij
where the equality is because of the greedy matching of pair (i, j) for the subsequent periods, and
the inequality holds because Vt+1 is increasing in the state vector. Therefore,
Ht(Q + εe
m×n
ij ,x,y)−Ht(Q + εem×nij ,x,y)≥(rtij −βrt+1ij )ε≥ 0.
Therefore, we can always weakly improve Q if it does not greedily match i with j. 
Proof of Corollary 1. Rt decreasing in t implies that r
t
ii =R
t is decreasing in t. By the triangle
inequality, disti′′j′ − disti′′i ≤ distij′ for any location i, i′′ and j′. Thus rt+1i′′i − rt+1i′′j′ = γt+1(disti′′j′ −
disti′′i) ≤ γt+1distij′ ≤ γtdistij′ = Rt − rtij′ = rtii − rtij′ , for any i′′ ∈ D and j′ ∈ S. This shows that
(i, i)M (i, j′) for any j′ ∈ S. By symmetry, (i, i)M (i′, j) for any i′ ∈D. Moreover, for all i′ ∈D
and j′ ∈ S, rti′i− rti′j′ = γt+1(disti′j′ − disti′i)≤ γtdistij′ = rtii− rtij′ . This is equivalent to rtii + rti′j′ ≥
rti′i+r
t
ij′ for all i
′ ∈D and j′ ∈ S. This shows that M can be defined asMs according to Definition
2. 
Proof of Proposition 3. We focus on the matching in round 2, and only consider the case with
z1 ≥ 0 and z1 ≥ 0 (the case with z1 < 0 and z2 < 0 is symmetric).
Using the formulation (D.5)–(D.6) in Appendix D, the optimal matching quantity solves
maxq∈M(z) Jt(q,z). Let us use pd := z1− q and ps = z2− q as decision variables in place of q. Then,
pd = ps + z1− z2 = ps + IB. Since both pd and ps need to be nonnegative, the feasible range of ps is
IB− ≤ ps ≤ z2.
We rewrite Jt(q,z) as a function of pd and ps. Since 0≤ q≤min{z1, z2}, we have
Jt(q,z) =r
t
12q+ r
t+1
11 Emin
{
α(z1− q) +Dt+11 , St+11
}
+ rt+122 Emin
{
Dt+12 , β(z2− q) +St+12
}
+EUt+1(α(z1− q) +Dt+11 −St+11 , β(z2− q) +St+12 −Dt+12 )
=rt12(z2− ps) + rt+111 Emin
{
α(ps + IB) +D
t+1
1 , S
t+1
1
}
+ rt+122 Emin
{
Dt+12 , βps +S
t+1
2
}
+EUt+1(α(ps + IB) +D
t+1
1 −St+11 , βps +St+12 −Dt+12 ),
which depends on IB, ps and also linearly on z2. We write Jt(q,z) = r
t
12z2 + Jˇt(ps, IB).
7It is easy to see that Jˇt is concave in ps (by Lemma D.8 Ut+1 is concave). Let p
t,IB
s,+ ∈
arg maxps≥IB− Jˇt(ps, IB). Given the constraint IB
− ≤ ps ≤ z2, the optimal decision in terms of ps is
min
¶
z2, p
t,IB
s,+
©
.
Let us denote pt,IBd,+ := IB + p
t,IB
s,+ . The optimal decision in terms of pd is IB + min
¶
z2, p
t,IB
s,+
©
=
min
¶
IB+ z2, IB+ p
t,IB
s,+
©
= min
¶
z1, p
t,IB
d,+
©
. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Let Jt and Ut be defined as in (D.5)–(D.5). To prove the proposition,
we present two lemmas.
Lemma A.3. Suppose that (rt22−rt12)−(rt+122 −rt+112 ) decreases in t. For 0≤ ε′ ≤ ε and t= 1, . . . , T ,
(rt+111 + r
t+1
22 − rt12)ε′+ (rt22− rt+122 )ε+ U˜t+1(z1 + ε′, z2 + ε′)− U˜t+1(z1, z2)≥ 0, where rT+1ij is defined as
zero for all i and j.
Proof of Lemma A.3. We prove this lemma by induction.
Since UT+1(z)≡ 0 and rT+1ij ≡ 0 for all i, j, we have U˜T+1(z) = 0. Then,
(rT+111 + r
T+1
22 − rT12)ε′+ (rT22− rT+122 )ε=− rT12ε′+ rT22ε≥ 0.
Suppose that (rt+211 +r
t+2
22 −rt+112 )ε′+(rt+122 −rt+222 )ε+ U˜t+2(z1 +ε′, z2 +ε′)− U˜t+2(z1, z2)≥ 0 for any
z = (z1, z2) and 0≤ ε′ ≤ ε. We will show that the same inequality holds for t+ 1, i.e., (rt+111 + rt+122 −
rt12)ε
′+ (rt22− rt+122 )ε+ U˜t+1(z1 + ε′, z2 + ε′)− U˜t+1(z1, z2)≥ 0 for any z = (z1, z2) and 0≤ ε′ ≤ ε.
let qˆ ∈ arg maxq≥0 J˜t+1(q,z). We consider the following cases.
Case 1: z ∈ R2++. It is easy to see that qˆ + ε′ is a feasible matching quantity between type 1
demand and type 2 supply under the state (z1 + ε
′, z2 + ε′). Thus,
U˜t+1(z1 + ε
′, z2 + ε
′)− U˜t+1(z1, z2)≥ J˜t+1(qˆ+ ε′, z1 + ε′, z2 + ε′)− J˜t+1(qˆ, z1, z2) = (−rt+111 − rt+122 + rt+112 )ε′.
It follows that
(rt+111 + r
t+1
22 − rt12)ε′+ (rt22− rt+122 )ε+ U˜t+1(z1 + ε′, z2 + ε′)− U˜t+1(z1, z2)
≥(rt+111 + rt+122 − rt12)ε′+ (rt22− rt+122 )ε+ (−rt+111 − rt+122 + rt+112 )ε′
=− (rt12− rt+112 )ε′+ (rt22− rt+122 )ε
≥[(rt22− rt+122 )− (rt12− rt+112 )]ε
=[(rt22− rt12)− (rt+122 − rt+112 )]≥ 0.
8Case 2: z∈R2−−. Let ε′′ = min{qˆ, ε}. It is easy to see that qˆ+ ε′′ is a feasible decision under the
state z + ε′12 = (z1 + ε′, z2 + ε′). Then,
U˜t+1(z + ε
′12)− U˜t+1(z)
≥J˜t+1(qˆ+ ε′′,z + ε′1)− J˜t+1(qˆ,z)
=− rt+121 ε′′+EU˜t+2(z1− qˆ+ ε′− ε′′+Dt+11 −St+11 , z2− qˆ+ ε′− ε′′+Dt+12 −St+12 )
−EU˜t+2(z1− qˆ+Dt+21 −St+21 , z2− qˆ+Dt+22 −St+22 )
≥− rt+121 ε′′− (rt+211 + rt+222 − rt+112 )(ε′− ε′′)− (rt+122 − rt+222 )ε0,
for any ε0 ≥ ε′− ε′′. We set ε0 = ε′− ε′′.
It follows that
(rt+111 + r
t+1
22 − rt12)ε′+ (rt22− rt+122 )ε+ U˜t+1(z1 + ε′, z2 + ε′)− U˜t+1(z1, z2)
≥(rt+111 + rt+122 − rt12)ε′+ (rt22− rt+122 )ε− rt+121 ε′′− (rt+211 + rt+222 − rt+112 )(ε′− ε′′)− (rt+122 − rt+222 )ε0
=(rt+111 + r
t+1
22 − rt12)ε′+ (rt22− rt+122 )ε− rt+121 ε′′− (rt+211 + rt+222 − rt+112 )(ε′− ε′′)− (rt+122 − rt+222 )(ε′− ε′′)
=(rt+111 + r
t+1
22 )ε
′− (rt12− rt+112 )ε′+ (rt22− rt+122 )ε− (rt+211 + rt+222 )(ε′− ε′′)− rt+121 ε′′− rt+112 ε′′− (rt+122 − rt+222 )(ε′− ε′′)
=(rt+111 + r
t+1
22 )ε
′− (rt12− rt+112 )ε′+ (rt22− rt+122 )ε− rt+121 ε′′− rt+112 ε′′− (rt+211 + rt+122 )(ε′− ε′′)
=(rt+111 − rt+211 )(ε′− ε′′)− (rt12− rt+112 )ε′+ (rt22− rt+122 )ε− rt+121 ε′′− rt+112 ε′′+ (rt+111 + rt+122 )ε′′
≥[(rt22− rt12)− (rt+122 − rt+112 )]ε′+ (rt+111 + rt+122 − rt+121 − rt+112 )ε′′.
It follows from Assumption 2 that (rt22 − rt12)− (rt+122 − rt+112 )≥ 0, and from Assumption 1 that
rt+111 + r
t+1
22 − rt+121 − rt+112 ≥ 0. Therefore, we have (rt+111 + rt+122 − rt12)ε′ + (rt22 − rt+122 )ε+ U˜t+1(z1 +
ε′, z2 + ε′)− U˜t+1(z1, z2)≥ 0.
Case 3: z∈R2+−. In this case, we have
U˜t+1(z + ε
′1)− U˜t+1(z)
=J˜t+1(0,z + ε
′1)− J˜t+1(0,z)
=− rt+111 ε′+ rt+211 ε′+EU˜t+2(z1 + ε′+Dt1−St1, z2 + ε′+Dt2−St2)−EU˜t+2(z1 +Dt1−St1, z2 +Dt2−St2)
It follows that
(rt+111 + r
t+1
22 − rt12)ε′+ (rt22− rt+122 )ε+ U˜t+1(z1 + ε′, z2 + ε′)− U˜t+1(z1, z2)
9=(rt+211 + r
t+1
22 − rt12)ε′+ (rt22− rt+122 )ε
− (rt+211 + rt+222 − rt+112 )ε′− (rt+122 − rt+222 )ε
+ (rt+211 + r
t+2
22 − rt+112 )ε′+ (rt+122 − rt+222 )ε
+EU˜t+2(z1 + ε
′+Dt1−St1, z2 + ε′+Dt2−St2)−EU˜t+2(z1 +Dt1−St1, z2 +Dt2−St2)
=[(rt+122 − rt+222 )− (rt12− rt+112 )]ε′+ [(rt22− rt+122 )− (rt+122 − rt+222 )]ε
≥ [(rt+122 − rt+222 )− (rt12− rt+112 ) + (rt22− rt+122 )− (rt+122 − rt+222 )]ε′
=
[
(rt22− rt+122 )− (rt12− rt+112 )
]
ε′ ≥ 0,
where the first inequality holds because ε′ ≤ ε and (rt22− rt+122 )− (rt+122 − rt+222 )≥ 0 (By Assumption
2), and the second inequality holds because of Assumption 2.
Case 4: z∈R+−+. In this case, we have
U˜t+1(z + ε
′1)− U˜t(z)
=J˜t+1(0,z + ε
′1)− J˜t+1(0,z)
=− rt+122 ε′+ rt+222 ε′+EU˜t+2(z1 + ε′+Dt+21 −St+21 , z2 + ε′+Dt+22 −St+22 )
−EU˜t+2(z1 +Dt+21 −St+21 , z2 +Dt+22 −St+22 ).
It follows that
(rt+111 + r
t+1
22 − rt12)ε′+ (rt22− rt+122 )ε+ U˜t+1(z1 + ε′, z2 + ε′)− U˜t+1(z1, z2)
=(rt+111 + r
t+1
22 − rt12)ε′+ (rt22− rt+122 )ε− rt+122 ε′+ rt+222 ε′
+EU˜t+2(z1 + ε
′+Dt1−St+21 , z2 + ε′+Dt+12 −St+12 )−EU˜t+2(z1 +Dt+11 −St+11 , z2 +Dt+12 −St+12 )
=(rt+111 + r
t+2
22 − rt12)ε′+ (rt22− rt+122 )ε
+EU˜t+2(z1 + ε
′+Dt+21 −St+21 , z2 + ε′+Dt+22 −St+22 )−EU˜t+2(z1 +Dt+21 −St+21 , z2 +Dt+22 −St+22 )
=(rt+111 + r
t+2
22 − rt12)ε′+ (rt22− rt+122 )ε
− (rt+211 + rt+222 − rt+112 )ε′− (rt+122 − rt+222 )ε
+ (rt+211 + r
t+2
22 − rt+112 )ε′+ (rt+122 − rt+222 )ε
+EU˜t+2(z1 + ε
′+Dt+21 −St+21 , z2 + ε′+Dt+22 −St+22 )−EU˜t+2(z1 +Dt+21 −St+21 , z2 +Dt+22 −St+22 )
≥(rt+111 + rt+222 − rt12)ε′+ (rt22− rt+122 )ε− (rt+211 + rt+222 − rt+112 )ε′− (rt+122 − rt+222 )ε
=[(rt+111 − rt+211 )− (rt12− rt+112 ]ε′+ [(rt22− rt+122 )− (rt+122 − rt+222 )]ε
10
≥[(rt+112 − rt+212 )− (rt12− rt+112 )]ε′+ [(rt22− rt+122 )− (rt+122 − rt+222 )]ε
≥− [(rt12− rt+112 )− (rt+112 − rt+212 )]ε+ [(rt22− rt+122 )− (rt+122 − rt+222 )]ε
≥{[(rt22− rt12)− (rt+122 − rt+112 )]− [(rt+122 − rt+112 )− (rt+222 − rt+212 )]}ε.
where the first inequality follows from the induction hypothesis, the second one from Assumption
2, and the third one holds because (rt22 − rt12) − (rt+122 − rt+112 ) decreases in t. The induction is
completed. 
Lemma A.4. Suppose that α = β = 1. The functions U˜t(z) := −rt11z+1 − rt22z+2 + Ut(z) and
J˜t(q,z) :=−rt11z+1 − rt22z+2 +Jt(q,z) are L\-concave with respect to all variables.
Proof of Lemma A.4. By using the equality min{a, b} = a − (a − b)+, we can rewrite Jt as
follows.
Jt(q,z) =r
t
12q
+ + rt21q
−+EDt1 +ES
t
2
+ rt+111 E(z1− q)+− rt+111 E(z1− q+Dt+11 −St+11 )+
+ rt+122 E(z2− q)+− rt+122 E(z2− q+St+12 −Dt+12 )+
+EUt+1(z1− q+Dt+11 −St+11 , z2− q+St+12 −Dt+12 ).
Then, by definition, we have
J˜t(q,z) =ED
t
1 +ES
t
2− rt11z+1 − rt22z+2 + rt12q+ + rt21q−+ rt+111 E(z1− q)+ + rt+122 E(z2− q)+
+EU˜t+1(z1− q+Dt+11 −St+11 , z2− q+St+12 −Dt+12 ). (A.3)
We further rewrite J˜t(q,z) as follows.
J˜t(q,z) =ED
t
1 +ES
t
2− rt11z+1 − rt22z+2 + (rt12 + rt21)q+− rt21q+ rt+111 E(z1− q)+ + rt+122 E(z2− q)+
+EU˜t+1(z1− q+Dt+11 −St+11 , z2− q+St+12 −Dt+12 )
=EDt1 +ES
t
2− rt11[z+1 − (z1− q)+]− rt22[z+2 − (z2− q)+] + (rt12 + rt21)q+− rt21q
− (rt11− rt+111 )(z1− q)+− (rt22− rt+122 )(z2− q)+
+EU˜t+1(z1− q+Dt+11 −St+11 , z2− q+St+12 −Dt+12 )
=EDt1 +ES
t
2− rt11q+− rt22q+ + (rt12 + rt21)q+− rt21q
− (rt11− rt+111 )(z1− q)+− (rt22− rt+122 )(z2− q)+
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+EU˜t+1(z1− q+Dt+11 −St+11 , z2− q+St+12 −Dt+12 )
=EDt1 +ES
t
2− (rt11 + rt22− rt12− rt21)q+− rt21q
− (rt11− rt+111 )(z1− q)+− (rt22− rt+122 )(z2− q)+
+EU˜t+1(z1− q+Dt+11 −St+11 , z2− q+St+12 −Dt+12 ),
where the first inequality is due to the fact q− = q+− q, and the third equality holds because for
q ∈M(z), z+1 − q+ = (z1− q)+ and z+2 − q+ = (z2− q)+.
We now prove the proposition by induction. U˜T (z) ≡ 0 is L\-concave. Suppose that U˜t+1(z) is
L\-concave. To show that U˜t(z) is L
\-concave, we need to prove that U˜t(z− η12) is supermodular
in (η,z).
Given the conditions rt11 ≥ rt+111 and rt22 ≥ rt+122 , the induction hypothesis and the concavity of
−(·)+, it is easy to see that J˜t(q− η,z− η12) is supermodular in (η, q,z). This implies that J˜t(q,z)
is L\-concave in (q,z), and thus it is also supermodular in (q,z). Since the set {(q,z) | q ∈M(z)} is
a lattice (See Appendix D), U˜t(z) = maxq∈M(z) J˜t(q,z) is supermodular. As a result, the function
U˜t(z−η12) is supermodular in z. To show that U˜t is L\-concave, it suffices to show that U˜(z−η12)
has increasing difference in (η, z1) and in (η, z2) within the feasible region {(z, η) | z− η12 ≥ 0}. In
the followings, we show that this is true within four regions (i.e., z ∈R++, z ∈R−−, z ∈R+− and
z∈R−+), as well as across the four regions.
For z ∈R++, M(z) = {z | 0≤ q≤min{z1, z2}}, and {(q, η,z) | z− η12 ≥ 0, q− η ∈M(z− η12)}=
{(q, η,z) | η≤ q≤min{z1, z2}}. The latter is a lattice. Then, U˜t(z− η12) = maxq−η∈M(z−η12) J˜t(q−
η,z−η12) is supermodular in (η,z) for η≤min{z1, z2}. This implies that U˜t(z−η1) has increasing
differences in (η, z1) and in (η, z2) for η≤min{z1, z2}.
For z ∈ R−−, M(z) = {z |max{z1, z2} ≤ q≤ 0}. U˜t(z− η1) = maxmax{z1,z2}≤q≤η J˜t(q − η,z− η1)
is supermodular in (η,z) for η ≥max{z1, z2} because {(q, η,z) |max{z1, z2} ≤ q≤ η} is a lattice.
Thus, U˜t(z− η12) has increasing differences in (η, z1) and in (η, z2) for η≤max{z1, z2}.
For z ∈R+− or z ∈R−+, we have M(z) = {0}. It is easy to verify that U˜t(z− η1) = J˜(0,z− η1)
is supermodular in {(η,z) | z− η12 ∈R+−}, and in {(η,z) | z− η12 ∈R−+}. Thus, U˜t(z− η12) has
increasing differences in (η, z1) and in (η, z2) for z− η12 ∈R+− and for z− η12 ∈R−+.
It remains to show that U˜(z− η12) has increasing differences in (η, z1) and in (η, z2) across the
4 regions. In the followings, we focus on the difference U˜t(z + ε12)− U˜t(z) across the boundary
between R2++ and R2+−. The same property across the other boundaries can be proved similarly.
More specifically, we will prove the following inequality holds for sufficiently small ε > 0.
U˜t(z1,0)− U˜t(z1− ε,−ε)≥−U˜t(z1, ε)− U˜t(z1− ε,0),
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which implies that U˜(z − η12) has increasing differences in (η, z2) across across the boundary
between R2++ and R2+−. (The increasing difference property with respect to (η, z1) can be proved
similarly.)
Let z1 > 0 and qˆ ∈ arg maxq∈M(z1,ε). Also, let ε′ = ε− qˆ. Then, by using the expression of J˜t given
in (A.3), we have
U˜t(z1, ε)− U˜t(z1− ε,0)
=J˜t(qˆ, z1, ε)− J˜t(0, z1− ε,0)
=− rt11z1− rt22ε+ rt12qˆ+ rt+111 (z1− qˆ) + rt+122 (ε− qˆ) +EU˜t+1(z1− qˆ+Dt+11 −St+11 , ε− qˆ+St+12 −Dt+12 )
− [−rt11(z1− ε) + rt+111 (z1− ε) +EU˜t+1(z1− ε+Dt+11 −St+11 , St+12 −Dt+12 )]
=− rt11ε− rt22ε+ rt12qˆ+ rt+111 (ε− qˆ) + rt+122 (ε− qˆ)
+EU˜t+1(z1− qˆ+Dt+11 −St+11 , ε− qˆ+St+12 −Dt+12 )−EU˜t+1(z1− ε+Dt+11 −St+11 , St+12 −Dt+12 )
=− rt11ε− rt22ε+ rt12(ε− ε′) + rt+111 ε′+ rt+122 ε′+EU˜t+1(z1− ε+ ε′+Dt+11 −St+11 , ε′+St+12 −Dt+12 )
−EU˜t+1(z1− ε+Dt+11 −St+11 , St+12 −Dt+12 ),
Also, for z1 > 0,
U˜t(z1,0)− U˜t(z1− ε,−ε)
=J˜t(0, z1,0)− J˜t(0, z1− ε,−ε)
=− rt11z1 + rt+111 z1 +EU˜t+1(z1 +Dt+11 −St+11 , St+12 −Dt+12 )
− [−rt11(z1− ε) + rt+111 (z1− ε) +EU˜t+1(z1− ε+Dt+11 −St+11 ,−ε+St+12 −Dt+12 )]
=− (rt11− rt+111 )ε
+EU˜t+1(z1 +D
t+1
1 −St+11 , St+12 −Dt+12 )−EU˜t+1(z1− ε+Dt+11 −St+11 ,−ε+St+12 −Dt+12 )
=− (rt11− rt+111 )ε
+EU˜t+1(z1 +D
t+1
1 −St+11 , St+12 −Dt+12 )−EU˜t+1(z1− ε+ ε′+Dt+11 −St+11 ,−ε+ ε′+St+12 −Dt+12 )
+EU˜t+1(z1− ε+ ε′+Dt+11 −St+11 ,−ε+ ε′+St+12 −Dt+12 )
−EU˜t+1(z1− ε+Dt+11 −St+11 ,−ε+St+12 −Dt+12 )
≥− (rt11− rt+111 )ε
+EU˜t+1(z1 +D
t+1
1 −St+11 , St+12 −Dt+12 )−EU˜t+1(z1− ε+ ε′+Dt+11 −St+11 ,−ε+ ε′+St+12 −Dt+12 )
+EU˜t+1(z1− ε+ ε′+Dt+11 −St+11 , ε′+St+12 −Dt+12 )−EU˜t+1(z1− ε+Dt+11 −St+11 , St+12 −Dt+12 ),
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where we obtain the inequality due to the increasing difference property of U˜t+1 by induction.
It then follows that
[U˜(z1,0)− U˜(z1− ε,−ε)]− [U˜t(z1, ε)− U˜t(z1− ε,0)]
≥rt+111 (ε− ε′) + rt22ε− rt12(ε− ε′)− rt+122 ε′
+EU˜t+1(z1 +D
t
1−St1, St2−Dt2)−EU˜t+1(z1− ε+ ε′+Dt1−St1,−ε+ ε′+St2−Dt2)
≥0.
By denoting ε˜ := ε− ε′, one can verify that the last inequality follows from Lemma A.3. 
We proceed to complete the proof of Proposition 4. Let us focus on the case with z1 ≥ 0 and
z2 ≥ 0 to show that pt,IBd,+ is increasing in IB and pt,IBs,+ is decreasing in IB.
Given the protection levels pt,IBd,+ and p
t,IB
s,+ , the optimal matching quantity (between type 1
demand and type 2 supply) in round 2 is q∗t = (z1− pt,IBd,+ )+ = (z2− pt,IBs,+ )+. The optimal matching
quantity q∗t solves max0≤q≤min{z1,z2} J˜t(q,z). By Lemma A.3, q
∗
t is increasing in z1 and z1, with the
increasing rate bounded from above by 1.
For a fixed value of IB = z1 − z2, we have z2 > pt,IBd,+ for sufficiently large z2 (in the mean time,
sufficiently large z1 and fixed IB). Therefore q
∗
t = z2−pt,IBs,+ . If we increase IB by further increasing
z1 while holding the value of z2, q
∗
t = z2 − pt,IBs,+ increases at a rate no greater than 1 (since q∗t
increases in z1 at a rate no greater than 1). This is possible only when p
t,IB
s,+ is decreasing in IB at
a rate no greater than 1.
Similarly, with IB fixed and both z1 and z2 are sufficiently large, we have q
∗
t = z1−pt,IBd,+ . We can
then increase IB be decreasing z2 while holding z1 fixed. This will decrease q
∗
t = z1−pt,IBd,+ at a rate
no greater than 1, which implies that pt,IBd,+ increases in IB at a rate no greater than 1. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Given that α= 0 and β = 1, we can rewrite equation (D.6) as follows.
Jt(q,z) =r
t
12q
+ + rt21q
−+ rt+111 Emin
{
Dt+11 , (z1− q)−+St+11
}
+ rt+122 Emin
{
Dt+12 , (z2− q)+ +St+12
}
+EUt+1(D
t+1
1 − (z1− q)−−St+11 , (z2− q)+ +St+12 −Dt+12 ).
Let us focus on the case with z1 > 0 and z2 > 0 (the case with negative z1 and z2 can be dealt
with analogously). In this case, the feasible set becomes M(q) = {q | 0≤ q≤min{z1, z2}}. Thus, for
z∈M(q)⋂R2++,
Jt(q,z) =r
t
12q+ r
t+1
11 Emin
{
Dt+11 , S
t+1
1
}
+ rt+122 Emin
{
Dt+12 , z2− q+St+12
}
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+EUt+1(D
t+1
1 −St+11 , z2− q+St+12 −Dt+12 ),
which is independent of z1. Let J¯t(p) :=−rt12p+rt+122 Emin
{
Dt+12 , p+S
t+1
2
}
+EUt+1(D
t+1
1 −St+11 , p+
St+12 − Dt+12 ). We have Jt(q,z) = rt12z2 + J¯t(z2 − q). Given that 0 ≤ q ≤ min{z1, z2}, the feasi-
ble range of p is p ∈ [(z2 − z1)+, z2]. Let pts,+ ∈ arg maxp≥0 J¯t(p). Then, the optimal solution to
maxp∈[(z2−z1)+,z2] J¯t(p) is p
t∗ = max
¶
(z2− z1)+, z2 ∧ pts,+
©
= max
¶
z2− z1, z2 ∧ pts,+
©
. Thus, it is opti-
mal to reduce type 2 supply to max
¶
z2− z1, z2 ∧ pts,+
©
by matching demand type 1 and supply
type 2 in round 2 of period t.
Similarly, we can prove that in the case with z1 < 0 and z2 < 0, it is optimal to reduce type 1
supply to z2− z1, (−z1)∧pts,− by matching type 2 demand with type 1 supply in round 2 of period
t. 
Proof of Lemma 1. We prove part (i), and part (ii) follows symmetrically.
Suppose that along the direction o→ d, i is closer to j than i′ is. We show that (i, j)Ms (i′, j)
in this case. It is easy to see that disti←j ≤ disti′←j, which implies that rtij ≥ rt
′
ij for all t. It remains
to verify that rtij − rti′j ≥ α(rt+1ij′′ − rt+1i′j′′). To see that, we have
rtij − rti′j = (Rt−disti←j)− (Rt−disti′←j) = disti′←j −disti←j = disti′←i.
Consider j′′ ∈ S. We consider the following two possibilities.
If j′′ is located between i and endpoint d, we have rt+1i←j′′ = 0 since i is not accessible from j
′′.
Then, α(rt+1ij′′ − rt+1i′j′′) =−αrt+1i′j′′ ≤ 0≤ rtij − rti′j.
If j′′ is located between endpoint o and i, then
α(rt+1ij′′ − rt+1i′j ) = α[(Rt+1−disti←j′′)− (Rt+1−disti′←j′′)] = α(disti′←j′′ −disti←j′′) = α ·disti′←i
≤disti′←i = rtij − rti′j.
Therefore (i, j)Ms (i′, j).
The above arguments also imply that (i′, j)Ms (i, j) if along the direction o→ d, i′ is closer to
j than i is. This proves part (i) 
Proof of Proposition 6. Part (i) follows directly from Lemma 1 and Theorem 1.
The condition Rt decreasing with respect to t in part (ii) ensures that rtij ≥ rt+1ij for any period
t. Then, part (ii) follows from Proposition 2. 
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Proof of Proposition 7. We prove the following statement by induction, which would imply the
proposition.
For any feasible matching policy P = {Qt(x,y)}t=1,...,T , we can construct another feasible match-
ing policy P¯ such that the property in the proposition is satisfied (i.e., type k demand is always
matched with type k greedily).
First we consider the single-period problem (i.e., t = 1). Let the current matching decision in
that single period be Q under the state (x,y). We construct a feasible decision Q¯ by repeatedly
applying the following modification steps until the desired property is satisfied.
Modifying the matching decision for the single-period probem.
Modification Step 1. If qk+1,k > 0 and qk,k−1 > 0 at the same time, let Q←Q + εem×nkk − εem×nk+1,k−
εek,k−1, where ε= min{qk+1,k, qk,k−1}.
Modification Step 2. If qk+1,k > 0 and uk > 0, let Q ← Q + εem×nkk − εem×nk+1,k, where ε =
min{qk+1,k, uk}.
Modification Step 3. If qk,k−1 > 0 and vk > 0, let Q ← Q + εem×nkk − εem×nk,k−1, where ε =
min{qk,k−1, vk}.
The above steps transfer matching quantities from a low-priority pair to a high-priority (i.e.,
from (k−1, k) to (k, k) or from (k, k+1) to (k, k); priority is defined by ). Note that any quantity
is transferred at most once (no quantity would be transferred out from (k, k) since it is already a
highest priority pair under ). In the followings, we verify that for any quantity transferred, the
matching reward associated with this quantity after the transfer is at least 1
2
of its reward before
the transfer.
In step 1 of the above procedure, before the transfer, a total reward rtk+1,kε+ r
t
k,k−1ε is received
by matching type k − 1 demand with type k supply for the quantity ε, and matching type k
demand with type k+ 1 supply for the same quantity. After applying step 1, a total reward rtkkε
is received. Thus, the ratio of the post-transfer reward to the pre-transfer reward for the affected
matching quantity is rtkk/(r
t
k+1,k + r
t
k,k−1)≥ 12 , where the inequality holds because rtk+1,k ≤ rtkk and
rtk,k−1 ≤ rtkk.
In step 2 of the above procedure, before the transfer, a reward rtk+1,kε is received from the
matching quantity ε between type k+ 1 demand and type k supply. After the transfer, a reward
rtkk is received by redirecting the quantity to (k, k). Thus, the ratio of the post-transfer reward to
the pre-transfer reward for the affected matching quantity is rtkk/r
t
k+1,k ≥ 1.
Step 3 is analogous to step 2. The ratio of the post-transfer reward to the pre-transfer reward
for the affected matching quantity is rtkk/r
t
k,k−1 ≥ 1.
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For any matching quantity that is not transferred, the ratio of the post-transfer reward to the
pre-transfer reward for the affected matching quantity is exactly 1.
Let ε1, . . . , εL be the matching quantities transferred at some point of the procedure, and εL+1
be the untransferred quantity. Also we let rε11 , . . . , r
εL+1
L+1 be the matching rewards corresponding
to ε1, . . . , εK+1 before applying the procedure, and r¯
ε1
1 , . . . , r¯
εL+1
L+1 the rewards after applying the
procedure. Then, the ratio of the total post-transfer reward to the total pre-transfer reward is
∑L+1
`=` r¯
ε`
`∑L+1
`=` r
ε`
`
≥ min
k=1,...,n
rtkk
rtk−1,k + r
t
k,k+1
≥ 1
2
.
Now suppose that the statement holds for any T -period problem. We will show that it is also
true for a (T + 1)-period problem.
Let ΩT+1 be the set of all possible realizations of demand and supply realization over the T + 1
periods. For a realization ω ∈ΩT+1, let Qt(ω) be the matching decision in period t under policy P ,
and (xt(ω|P ),yt(ω|P )) the state in period t under policy P for the realization ω.
As in the single-period problem, for any given realization ω, we modify the matching decision in
period 1 so that it satisfies the desired properties.
Modification 1. If q1k,k−1(ω)> 0 and q
1
k+1,k(ω)> 0 at the same time, let Q
1(ω)←Q1(ω)+εem×nkk −
εem×nk,k−1−εem×nk+1,k, where ε= min
¶
q1k,k−1(ω), q
1
k+1,k(ω)
©
. This leads to a reduction r1k,k−1ε+r
1
k+1,kε in
rewards, in exchange for an extra reward r1kkε between type k demand and type k supply in period
1. The ratio of post-modification reward rtkkε to the pre-modification reward r
1
k,k−1ε+ r
1
k+1,kε is
therefore r1kk/(r
1
k,k−1 + r
1
k+1,k)≥ 12 since r1kk ≥max
¶
r1k,k−1, r
1
k+1,k
©
.
Modification Step 2. If q1k,k−1(ω) > 0 and v
1
k(ω) > 0, we let Q
1(ω)←Q1(ω) + εem×nkk − εem×nk,k−1,
where ε = min
¶
q1k,k−1(ω), v
1
k(ω)
©
. This modification in period 1 reduces the the post-matching
level v1k(ω) by ε, and thus the capacity of type k supply in the beginning of period 2, y
2
k(ω | P ),
by βε. We will need to modify the matching decision Q2(ω) in period 2 to keep it feasible. Due
to the reduction in y2k(ω | P ), there exist ε2kk ≥ 0 and ε2k+1,k ≥ 0 such that ε2kk + ε2k+1,k ≤ βε and
Q2(ω)− ε2kkem×nkk − ε2k+1,kem×nk+1,k is feasible after we modify the matching decision in period 1. The
post-matching level of type k supply is reduced by βε− (ε2kk + ε2k+1,k), compared with the post-
matching level v2k(ω) before the modification. Thus, the capacity of type k supply in period 3 is
reduced by β[βε − (ε2kk + ε2k+1,k)] ≤ βε − (ε2kk + ε2k+1,k). There exist ε3kk ≥ 0 and ε3k+1,k ≥ 0 such
that ε3kk + ε
3
k+1,k ≤ β2ε − βε2kk + ε2k+1,k and Q3(ω) − ε3kkem×nkk − ε3k+1,kem×nk+1,k is feasible after we
modify the decisions in periods 1 and 2. Recursively, we can show that there exists εtkk ≥ 0 and
εtk+1,k ≥ 0 for t= 2, . . . , T such that
∑T
t=2 β
T−t(εtkk + ε
t
k+1,k)≤ βT−1ε and that Qt(ω)− εtkkem×nkk −
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εtk+1,ke
m×n
k+1,k is feasible in period t for the realization ω, after we have modified the decisions in
previous periods. We will let Qt(ω)←Qt(ω)− εtkkem×nkk − εtk+1,kem×nk+1,k In this step of modification,
there is a total reduction rtk,k−1ε+
∑T
t=2(r
t
kkε
t
kk + r
t
k+1,kε
t
k+1,k) in rewards from period 1 to period
T . In the mean time, in period 1, an extra reward r1kkε is received in period t. The ratio of the
latter to the former is r1kkε/[r
1
k,k−1ε+
∑T
t=2(r
t
kkε
t
kk + r
t
k+1,kε
t
k+1,k)]≥ 12 , where the inequality holds
because r1k,k−1 ≤ r1kk and
∑T
t=2(r
t
kkε
t
kk+r
t
k+1,kε
t
k+1,k)≤
∑T
t=2 r
t
kk(ε
t
kk+ε
t
k+1,k)≤
∑T
t=2 β
−(t−1)r1kk(ε
t
kk+
εtk+1,k) = r
1
kkβ
−(T−1)∑T
t=2 β
(T−t)(εtkk + ε
t
k+1,k)≤ r1kkβ−(T−1) · r1kkβT−1ε= r1kkε.
Modification Step 3. If q1k+1,k(ω) > 0 and u
1
k(ω) > 0, we let Q
1(ω)←Q1(ω) + em×nkk − em×nk+1,k.
Analogous to Modification Step 2, there exist tkk ≥ 0 and tk,k−1 ≥ 0 such that
∑T
t=2 β
T−t(tkk +
tk,k−1)≤ βT−1. We modifify the matching deicision as Qt←Qt(ω)− tkkem×nkk − tk,k−1em×nk+1,k.
After repeatedly applying the above modification steps, we arrive at a matching policy P˜ =¶
Q˜t
©
t=1,...,T
that satisfies the statement in period t. For the affected matching quantities in those
modification steps, the post-modification rewards are at least 1
2
of the pre-modification rewards.
Now for any t= 2, . . . , T , Q˜t(ω) is a feasible decision in period t for the realization ω. Let the
policy P˜ |t=2,...,T be policy P˜ confined to periods t = 2, . . . , T . By induction, we can construct
another policy P¯ |t=2,...,T for periods t= 2, . . . , T such that the total reward received under P¯ |t=2,...,T
is at least 1
2
of the total reward under P˜ |t=2,...,T .
Finally, let us define policy P¯ :=
¶
Q˜1
©⊕{P˜ |t=2,...,T}, i.e., applying the matching decision Q˜1 in
period 1 and policy P˜ |t=2,...,T in the remaining periods. According to our analysis, the total reward
under policy P¯ is at least 1
2
of that under the original policy P . 
Proof of Lemma 2. We prove that (i, j)Ms (i′, j) if i > i′. The second statement in the lemma
would then follow symmetrically.
We have rtij = r
t
id + r
t
js ≥ rti′d + rtjs = rti′j given that i′ > i.
For any j′′ ∈ S, we have rtij − rti′j = rtid− rti′d ≥ rtid− rt+1i′d = rt+1ij′′ − rt+1i′j′′ .
It remains to show that rtij + r
t
i′j′ ≥ rtij′ + ri′jat for i′ > i and j′ > i. This holds trivially since It
remains to show that rtij + r
t
i′j′ = r
t
ij′ + ri′ja
t under the additive reward structure. 
Proof of Proposition 8. The proposition follows directly from Lemma 2. More details are pro-
vided in Appendix E on how the total matching quantity in a period uniquelly determines the
matching quantities. 
Proof of Proposition 9. Let POSA[1,t],Greedy[t+1,T ] be the policy that applies the one-step-ahead
policy up to period t, and uses greedy matching from period t+1 to period T . In the followings, we
show that the policy POSA[1,t],Greedy[t+1,T ] achieves a higher total reward than POSA[1,t−1],Greedy[t,T ].
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The two policies, POSA[1,t],Greedy[t+1,T ] and POSA[1,t−1],Greedy[t,T ] coincide with each other in periods
1, . . . , t− 1, and therefore have the same expected rewards in those periods.
For any state in the beginning of period t, the policy POSA[1,t],Greedy[t+1,T ] uses the one-step-
ahead policy in that period, which is optimal (for maximizing the total expected reward from
period t to period T ) given that POSA[1,t],Greedy[t+1,T ] will use greedy matching from the next
period on. In contrast, the policy POSA[1,t−1],Greedy[t,T ] uses greedy matching in period t, which is
suboptimal in response to the greedy matching it enforces from period t+ 1 to period T . Con-
sequently, POSA[1,t],Greedy[t+1,T ] leads to a higher total expected reward from period t to period T
than POSA[1,t−1],Greedy[t,T ]. The overall total expected matching reward from period 1 to period T
is higher under POSA[1,t],Greedy[t+1,T ] than under POSA[1,t−1],Greedy[t,T ].
The one-step-ahead policy coincides with POSA[1,T−1],Greedy[T,T ], and the greedy matching policy
coincides with POSA[1,0],Greedy[1,T ]. Thus, the former leads to a higher total expected reward than
the latter. 
Proof of Proposition 10. We use the formulation (E.9)–(E.10) in Appendix E to prove the fol-
lowing lemma.
Lemma A.5. Suppose α = β = 1. V˜t(x˜, y˜) is L
\-concave in (x˜, y˜) for t = 1, . . . , T + 1, and
G˜t(Q, x˜, y˜) is L
\-concave in (Q, x˜, y˜) for t= 1, . . . , T .
Proof of Lemma A.5. The proof is by induction on t. Clearly, V˜T+1(x˜, y˜) = −x˜U−1m (rtd)T −
y˜U−1n (r
t
s)
T is L\-concave in (x˜, y˜). We suppose that V˜t+1(x˜, y˜) is L
\-concave in (x˜, y˜). Then by def-
inition of L\-concavity and submodularity, for any given D˜t+1 and S˜t+1, V˜t+1(x˜ + D˜
t+1, αy˜ + S˜t+1)
is L\-concave in (x˜, y˜). Now consider period t. Since Q≤min{x˜n, y˜m}.
V˜t+1((x˜−Q1n)+ + D˜t+1, (y˜−Q1m)+ + S˜t+1)
= V˜t+1((x˜[1,n−1]−Q1n−1)+ + D˜t+1[1,n−1], (x˜n−Q) + D˜t+1n , (y˜[1,m−1]−Q1m−1)+ + S˜t+1[1,m−1], (y˜m−Q) + S˜t+1m ),
which is L\-concave in (Q, x˜, y˜) by applying Chen et al. (2014, Lemma 4) and noting the monotonic-
ity proved in Lemma E.9. By Simchi-Levi et al. (2014, Proposition 2.3.4(c)), ED˜t+1,S˜t+1 [V˜t+1((x˜−
Q1m)
+ + D˜t+1, (y˜−Q1n)+ + S˜t+1)] is L\-concave in (Q, x˜, y˜), thus the last term in (E.10) is L\-
concave in (Q, x˜, y˜). The first two terms in (E.10) are L\-concave in (Q, x˜, y˜), because −(x˜i′ −Q)+
is supermodular in (Q, x˜i′), −(y˜j′ −Q)+ is supermodular in (Q, y˜j′) and L\-concavity is preserved
under any nonnegative linear combination. Since the other terms are linear, G˜t(Q, x˜, y˜) is L
\-
concave in (Q, x˜, y˜). By Simchi-Levi et al. (2014, Proposition 2.3.4(e)), V˜t(x˜, y˜) is L
\-concave in
(x˜, y˜). This completes the induction. 
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We now proceed to prove the proposition.
Since L\-concavity implies supermodularity, by Lemma A.5, G˜t(Q, x˜, y˜) is L
\-concave, a fortiori,
supermodular in (Q, x˜, y˜). By Simchi-Levi et al. (2014, Theorem 2.2.8), the optimal solution to
(E.9), denoted by Qˆt(x˜, y˜), is nondecreasing in (x˜, y˜). Since the higher the original state (x,y),
the higher the transformed state (x˜, y˜), the optimal solution Q∗t (x,y), expressed in terms of the
original state, is nondecreasing in (x,y). Thus, ∂Q
t∗(x,y)
∂xi
≥ 0 for any i∈D.
By the definition of L\-concavity, G˜t(Q − ξ, x˜ − ξ1m, y˜ − ξ1n) is supermodular in (Q, x˜, y˜, ξ).
Then, for Q> Qˆt(x˜, y˜) + , we have
G˜t(Q, x˜ + 1m, y˜ + 1n)− G˜t(Qˆt(x˜, y˜) + , x˜ + 1m, y˜ + 1n)≤ G˜t(Q− , x˜, y˜)− G˜t(Qˆt(x˜, y˜), x˜, y˜)≤ 0,
where the first inequality is derived by definition of supermodularity and the second inequality is
due to the optimality of Qˆt. This implies that any matching quantity Q> Qˆt(x˜, y˜) +  is no better
than Qˆt(x˜, y˜) +  for the state (x˜ + 1m, y˜ + 1n). Therefore, Qˆt(x˜ + 1m, y˜ + 1n)≤ Qˆt(x˜, y˜) + .
By the monotonicity of Qˆt(x˜, y˜), Qˆt(x˜ + 1m, y˜)≤ Qˆt(x˜ + 1m, y˜ + 1n)≤ Qˆt(x˜, y˜) + . Expressed
in the original state, Q∗t (x + e
n
1 ,y)≤Q∗t (x,y) + . This implies that ∂Q
t∗(x,y)
∂x1
≤ 1.
For any two original states (x+enk ,y) and (x+e
n
k+1,y), k= 1, . . . , n−1, their transformed states
can be ordered as (x˜ + 1[k,m], y˜)≥ (x˜ + 1[k+1,m], y˜), where 1[k,m] is an n-dimensional vector with
the k-th up to m-th entry being one and the rest of the entries being all zeros. By the monotonicity
of Qˆt(x˜, y˜), Qˆt(x˜ + 1[k,m], y˜) ≥ Qˆt(x˜ + 1[k+1,m], y˜). This implies that Qt∗(x + emk ,y) ≥ Qt∗(x +
emk+1,y). Thus we have Q
t∗(x + emk ,y)−Qt∗(x,y)≥Qt∗(x + emk+1,y)−Qt∗(x,y), which implies
that ∂Q
t∗(x,y)
∂xk+1
≤ ∂Qt∗(x,y)
∂xk
.
We have proved that 0 ≤ ∂Qt∗(x,y)
∂xi
≤ 1 and ∂Qt∗(x,y)
∂xi
≥ ∂Qt∗(x,y)
∂xi+1
. Analogously we can show that
0≤ ∂Qt∗(x,y)
∂yj
≤ 1 for all j ∈ S, and ∂Qt∗(x,y)
∂yj
≥ ∂Qt∗(x,y)
∂yj+1
. 
Proof of Proposition 11. As part of the one-step-ahead heuristic, the greedy matching policy is
implemented from period t+ 1. We first prove two lemmas on the greedy matching policy. With
vertically differentiated types, the greedy matching policy also follows the top-down structure but
does not reserve demand or supply. Let V gt (x,y) be the expected total discounted surplus under
the greedy matching policy from the current period t to the end of the horizon, given the current
state (x,y).
We first prove the following lemma.
Lemma A.6. For  > 0 and δk ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , j such that ∑jk=1 δk = , the difference V gt (x,y−∑j
k=1 δkek+ej)−V gt (x,y) depends only on δk, k= 1, . . . , j, x˜m and y[1,j−1]. Symmetrically, V gt (x−
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∑i
k=1 δkek + ei,y)−V gt (x,y) depends only on δk, k= 1, . . . , i, y˜n and x[1,i−1], for  > 0, δk ≥ 0 and∑i
k=1 δk = .
Proof of Lemma A.6. We will focus on the difference V gt (x,y−∑jk=1 δkek + ej)−V gt (x,y) and
the other difference satisfies the desired property by symmetry. If we define δj+1 = · · ·= δm = 0 and
δ = (δ1, . . . , δm), the difference can be rewritten as V
g
t (x,y− δ + ej)−V gt (x,y).
We prove the lemma by induction. Suppose the desired property holds for t+ 1.
If x˜n < y˜j−1, there exists 1 ≤ j′ ≤ j − 1 such that y˜j′−1 ≤ x˜n < y˜j′ . Under the greedy match-
ing policy, all the demand and types 1, . . . , j′ − 1 supply is matched, a quantity x˜n − y˜j′−1 in
type j′ supply is matched, and types j′ + 1, . . . ,m supply will not be matched. This leads to
the post-matching levels Y = (0[1,j′−1], y˜j′ − x˜n,y[j′+1,m]) for the supply types. Then V gt (x,y) =
rtdx
T + rt[1,j′−1],sy
T
[1,j′−1] + r
t
j′s(x˜n− y˜j′−1) + γEV gt+1(Dt+1,Y + St+1).
On the other hand, under the state (x,y−δ+ ej), all the demand will again be fully matched,
and the total amounts of demand and supply do not change compared to the state (x,y). There
exists j′ ≤ j′′ ≤ j − 1 such that types 1, . . . , j′′ − 1 supply are fully matched and types j′′ +
1, . . . ,m supply are not matched. This leads to the post-matching levels Y′ = (0[1,j′′−1], y˜j′′ −
δ˜j′′ − x˜n,y[j′′+1,m] − δ[j′′+1,m]) + ej, where δ˜k def= ∑k`=1 δ` for 1 ≤ k ≤m. Then V gt (x,y) = rtdxT +
rt[1,j′′−1],s(y[1,j′′−1]− δ[1,j′′−1])T + rtj′′s(x˜n− y˜j′′−1 + δ˜j′′−1) + γEV gt+1(D, αY′+ S). Let
∆ =
 (0[1,j′], y˜j′ − x˜n,y[j′+1,j′′−1], yj′′ − (y˜j′′ − δ˜j′′ − x˜n),δ[j′′+1,m]) if j
′′ > j′,
(0[1,j′−1], δ˜j′ ,δ[j′+1,m]) if j
′′ = j′.
It is easy to verify that ∆ ≥ 0, ∑mk=1 ∆k = ∑mk=1 δk = , ∆k = 0 for k = j + 1, . . . ,m, and ∆
depends only on , δ and (x˜n,y[1,j−1]). In addition, Y′ = Y−∆+ ej. Then V gt+1(Dt+1,Y +St+1)−
V gt+1(D
t+1,Y −∆ + ej + St+1) depends only on δ, x˜n, D˜t+1n and y[1,j−1]. (Note that Y[1,j−1] is
uniquely determined by y[1,j−1].) Then the difference
V gt (x,y− δ + ej)−V gt (x,y)
=rt[1,j′−1],sy
T
[1,j′−1] + r
t
j′s(x˜n− y˜j′−1)− rt[1,j′′−1],s(y[1,j′′−1]− δ[1,j′′−1])T− rtj′′s(x˜n− y˜j′′−1 + δ˜j′′−1)
+E
[
V gt+1(D
t+1,Y + St+1)−V gt+1(Dt+1,Y−∆ + ej + S)
]
depends only on δ, x˜n and y[1,j−1].
If x˜n ≥ y˜j−1, the greedy matching policy leads to the same post-matching levels under the two
states (x,y) and (x,y − δ + ej). We see that V gt (x,y − δ + ej)− V gt (x,y) = ∑jk=1 δk(rsj − rsk),
which is independent of (x,y).
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Combining the above analysis, we see that the difference V gt (x,y− δ + ej)− V gt (x,y) depends
only on δk, k= 1, . . . , j, x˜n and y[1,j−1]. 
Lemma A.7. The difference V gt (x + e
n
i ,y + e
m
j ) − V gt (x,y) depends only on  and
(x[1,i−1],y[1,j−1], x˜n, y˜m).
Proof of Lemma A.7. First, consider the case x˜n ≤ y˜m. If x˜n ≥ y˜j−1, then V gt (x+eni ,y+emj )−
V gt (x,y) = (r
d
i + r
s
j), which is independent of (x,y).
If y˜j′−1 ≤ x˜n < y˜j′ for some 1 ≤ j′ ≤ j − 1, Under state (x,y), the post-matching levels for the
supply types are v = (0[1,j′−1], y˜j′ − x˜n,y[j′+1,m]). The additional amount, , of type i demand
and the extra quantities δj′
def
= min{, y˜j′ − x˜n}, δj′+1 def= min{[− (y˜j′ − x˜n)]+, yj′+1}, . . . , δj−1 def=
min{[− (y˜j−2− x˜n)]+, yj−1}, δj def= [− (y˜j−1− x˜n)]+ are matched for supply types j′, j′+1, . . . , j−
1, j, respectively, under the new state (x+ eni ,y + e
m
j ). Let δ = (0, . . . ,0, δj′ , . . . , δj,0, . . . ,0)∈Rm+ .
Note that δ is a function of (x˜n,y[1,j−1]). Then we have
V gt (x + e
n
i ,y + e
m
j )−V gt (x,y)
=rtid+
m∑
k=1
rskδ
s
k +E
î
Vt+1(D
t+1, (v− δ + emj ) + St+1)−Vt+1(Dt+1,v + St+1)
ó
.
Since Vt+1(D
t+1, (v−δ+ emj )+St+1)−Vt+1(Dt+1,v+St+1) depends only on , δ, D˜t+1n and v[1,j−1]
by Lemma A.6, the difference V gt (x + e
n
i ,y + e
m
j )− V gt (x,y) depends only on , x˜n and y[1,j−1],
because δ is defined in terms of , x˜n and y[1,j−1].
Now consider the case x˜n > y˜m. By symmetry, we can show that V
g
t (x+ e
n
i ,y + e
m
j )−V gt (x,y)
depends only on , y˜m and x[1,i−1]. Combining those two cases, the difference depends only on 
and (x[1,i−1],y[1,j−1], x˜n, y˜m). 
We proceed to prove Proposition 11. We focus on the matching between type i demand and type
j supply, which happens under topdown-matching only when x˜i > y˜j−1 and y˜j > x˜i−1. Note that if
x˜i ≤ y˜j−1, there would be no type i demand left when we start to use type j supply. If y˜j ≤ x˜i−1,
there would be no type j supply left when we start to use type j demand. This proves part (i)
Let Ft(Q, x˜, y˜) be defined as in (F.16) of Appendix F, which is the total expected reward to
be received from period t to period T for using the total matching quantity Q in period t and
greedy matching from period t+ 1 on. Following the top-down structure, we start to match i with
j when the matching quantity Q reaches max{ ˜xi−1, y˜j−1}, and complete the matching between
i and j when the quantity reaches min{x˜i, y˜j}. Within this range of Q, we have (x˜−Q1m)+ =
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(0i−1, x˜[i,m]−Q1m−i+1) and (y˜−Q1m)+ = (0j−1, y˜[j,n]−Q1n−j+1). For sufficiently small ε > 0, we
have
(x˜− (Q+ ε)1m)+U−1m (rtd−αrt+1d )T− (x˜−Q1m)+U−1m (rtd−αrt+1d )T
=
m∑
i′′=i
(x˜i′′ −Q− ε)[(rti′′d− rti′′+1,d)−α(rt+1i′′d − rt+1i′′+1,d)]−
m∑
i′′=i
(x˜i′′ −Q)[(rti′′d− rti′′+1,d)−α(rt+1i′′d − rt+1i′′+1,d)]
=− ε
m∑
i′′=i
[(rti′′d− rti′′+1,d)−α(rt+1i′′d − rt+1i′′+1,d)]
=− ε(rtid−αrt+1id ).
Similarly, we have
(y˜− (Q+ ε)1m)+V−1n (rts−βrt+1s )T− (y˜−Q1m)+V−1n (rts−βrt+1s )T =−ε(rtjs−αrt+1js ).
By (F.16),
Ft(Q, x˜, y˜) =x˜U
−1
m (r
t
d)
T + y˜V−1n (r
t
s)
T +ED˜t+1U−1m +ES˜
t+1V−1n
− (x˜−Q1m)+U−1m (rtd−αrt+1d )T− (y˜−Q1m)+V−1n (rts−βrt+1s )T
+EV˜ gt+1(α(x˜−Q1m)+ + D˜t+1, β(y˜−Q1n)+ + S˜t+1).
Then, for max{x˜i−1, y˜j−1} ≤Q≤min{x˜i, y˜j},
Ft(Q+ ε, x˜, y˜)−Ft(Q, x˜, y˜)
=ε(rtid−αrt+1id + rtjs−αrt+1js )
+EV˜ gt+1(α(x˜− (Q+ ε)1m)+ + D˜t+1, β(y˜− (Q+ ε)1n)+ + S˜t+1)
−EV˜ gt+1(α(x˜−Q1m)+ + D˜t+1, β(y˜−Q1n)+ + S˜t+1)
=ε(rtid−αrt+1id + rtjs−αrt+1js )
+EV˜ gt+1(α(x˜−Q1m)+ + D˜t+1−αε
m∑
i′′=i
emi′′ , β(y˜−Q1n)+ + S˜t+1−βε
m∑
j′′=j
enj′′)
−EV˜ gt+1(α(x˜−Q1m)+ + D˜t+1, β(y˜−Q1n)+ + S˜t+1)
=ε(rtid + r
t
js)
+EV gt+1(α(x˜−Q1m)+U−1m + Dt+1−αεeni , β(y˜−Q1n)+V−1n + St+1−βεemj )
−EV gt+1(α(x˜−Q1m)+ + D˜t+1, β(y˜−Q1n)+ + S˜t+1).
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By Lemma A.6, Ft(Q+ ε, x˜, y˜)−Ft(Q, x˜ depends only on the first i− 1 entries of (x˜−Q1m)+,
the first j − 1 entries of (y˜ − Q1n)+, x˜m − Q and y˜n − Q. However, the first i − 1 entries of
(x˜ − Q1m)+ and the first j − 1 entries of (y˜ − Q1n)+ are equal to zero for max{x˜i−1, y˜j−1} ≤
Q ≤ min{x˜i, y˜j}. Thus, the difference only depends on x˜m − Q and y˜n − Q. Then, the par-
tial derivative ∂
∂Q
Ft(Q, x˜, y˜) only depends on x˜m − Q and y˜n − Q for max{x˜i−1, y˜j−1} ≤ Q ≤
min{x˜i, y˜j}. (If Ft is not differentiable in Q, we define ∂∂QFt(Q + ε, x˜, y˜) as ∂∂QFt(Q, x˜, y˜) :=
limε→0+[Ft(Q+ ε, x˜, y˜)−Ft(Q, x˜, y˜)]/ε.) Consequently, there exists a function F¯t(x˜m−Q, y˜n−Q)
such that it is identical to the function Ft(Q, x˜, y˜) up to a factor that is independent of Q. To
find the optimal solution to maxmax{x˜i−1,y˜j−1}≤Q≤min{x˜i,y˜j}Ft(Q, x˜, y˜), it is equivalent to solve
maxmax{x˜i−1,y˜j−1}≤Q≤min{x˜i,y˜j} F¯t(x˜m−Q, y˜n−Q).
Let pd := x˜m−Q and ps := y˜n−Q be the target levels for aggregate demand and supply, respec-
tively. Then, ps = pd− (x˜m− y˜n) = pd− IB. To ensure that max{x˜i−1, y˜j−1} ≤Q≤min{x˜i, y˜j}, we
require x˜m − x˜i ∧ y˜j ≤ pd ≤ x˜m − x˜i−1 ∨ y˜j−1. The problem maxmax{x˜i−1,y˜j−1}≤Q≤min{x˜i,y˜j} F¯t(x˜m −
Q, y˜n−Q) is further equivalent to the following problem.
max F¯t(pd, pd− IB)
S.t. x˜m− x˜i ∧ y˜j ≤ pd ≤ x˜m− x˜i−1 ∨ y˜j−1.
Let pt,IBij,d := arg maxpij,d≥IB+ F¯t(pd, pd− IB) (recall that F¯t is dependent on i and j). Then, it is
optimal (under the one-step-ahead policy) to reduce the aggregate demand to the target level pt,IBij,d ,
if pt,IBij,d lies within the range [x˜m − x˜i ∧ y˜j, x˜m − x˜i−1 ∨ y˜j−1]. If pt,IBij,d > x˜m − x˜i−1 ∨ y˜j−1, then the
aggregate demand is already below pt,IBij,d prior to matching i with j. In that case, i and j are not
matched at all. If pt,IBij,d < x˜m− x˜i ∧ y˜j, then the aggregate demand would be still above pt,IBij,d even
if we fully match i with j. In that case, we would match i with j to the full extent.
By defining pt,IBij,s := p
t,IB
ij,d − IB, we can show the one-step-ahead policy aims to let the aggregate
supply reach pt,IBij,s or as much as possible.
Part (ii) is thus proved.
Similar to the proof of Lemma A.5, we can show that V˜ gt is L
\-concave. By utilizing the L\-
concavity, part (ii) follows similar analysis as in the proof of Proposition 10. 
B. Connection between weak and strong compatibility
We now discuss a connection between policies weakly respecting and those (strongly) respect-
ing the partial order M. For a policy PW that weakly respects M, let us construct another
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policy PS that (strongly) respects M, such that PS leads to the same post-matching levels as
PW . To do this, let us consider (i, j) M (i′, j). In period t under the policy PW , the matching
quantities and post-matching levels satisfy that uti = 0 if q
t
i′j > 0. Suppose that a
t,M
i > 0. Then
by definition, 0 < at,Mi = xi −
∑
j′′:(i,j′′)/∈BM
ij,L
qtij′′ = xi −
∑
j′′:(i,j′′)∈A q
t
ij′′ +
∑
j′′:(i,j′′)∈BM
ij,L
qtij′′ =
uti +
∑
j′′:(i,j′′)∈BM
ij,L
qtij′′ =
∑
j′′:(i,j′′)∈BM
ij,L
qtij′′ . Thus, there exists (i, j
′′)∈BMij,L (i.e., (i, j)M (i, j′′))
such that qtij′′ > 0. We can reduce the matching quantities q
t
i′j and q
t
ij′ by the same amount ε :=
min
¶
qti′j, q
t
ij′
©
, and increase the matching quantities qtij and q
t
i′j′ by ε at the same time. By doing
so, we reduce both the matching quantity qti′j and a
t,M
i = u
t
i +
∑
j′′:(i,j′′)∈BM
ij,L
qtij′′ . By repeatedly
modifying the matching quantities in period t as described above, we will eventually arrive at a
policy PS, which (strongly) respects M (i.e., either qti′j = 0 or at,Mi = 0).
Now consider an optimal policy P ∗W that weakly respects M. Following the above logic, there
exists a policy PS with the same post-matching levels (u
t,vt) as the policy P ∗W in any period
t. Under both policies, in period t with state (x,y), the consumption of demand and supply is
given by (x−ut,y−vt). Thus, if we have obtained the post-matching levels (ut,vt) under policy
PS, by solving the single-period transportation problem with demand and supply consumption
(x− ut,y− vt) in each period t, we can arrive at the optimal policy P ∗W . This implies that the
optimal policy P ∗W is only different from a certain policy PS (strongly) respecting M by solving a
single-period transportation problem. But it would be challenging to identify such a policy PS by
restricting the search within the class of policies that (strongly) respect M.
C. Accounting for waiting costs
Even though we did not consider waiting costs of those demand and supply types that are not
immediately matched, those costs can be easily incorporated into the matching rewards. To see this,
we consider the following two problems. In first problem, demand type i (resp., supply type j) incurs
a per-unit waiting cost cti (resp., h
t
j) in period t if unmatched, and the unit matching reward between
i∈D and j ∈ S in period t is rtij. In the second problem, all waiting costs are equal to zero, and the
unit matching reward between i∈D and j ∈ S in period t is r¯ij := rtij +
∑T
τ=tα
τ−tcτj +
∑T
τ=t β
τ−thτj .
Let us refer to the first problem as Problem (W) and the second one as Problem (NW).
Proposition C.1. Problem (W) is equivalent to Problem (NW), in the sense that they share
the same optimal matching policy.
Proof of Proposition C.1. Let us focus on the problem (W) and its total reward less waiting
costs.
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For Problem (W), consider an arbitrary sample path of demand and supply realizations
{dt, st}t=1,...,T , where dt = (dt1, . . . , dtm) and st = (st1, . . . , stn) are the realizations of demand and
supply in period t, respectively, and a set of matching decisions {Qt}t=1,...,T feasible under the
aforementioned sample path. For a quantity q of type i demand that arrives in period t1 and
matched in period t2 ≥ t1, it incurs waiting cost in periods t1, t1 + 1, . . . , t2 − 1. In each period τ
(t1 ≤ τ ≤ t2− 1), only a fraction ατ−t1 of the original amount is retained, due to the partial carry-
over. Therefore, the corresponding original quantity in period t1 (to the matched quantity in period
t2) is qα
−(t2−t1). In period τ , the amount qα−(t2−t1)×ατ−t1 = qα−(t2−τ) is retained and incurs the
waiting cost qα−(t2−τ)cτi . Thus, the total waiting cost incurred by the original quantity qα
−(t2−t1) of
type i demand is
∑t2−1
τ=t1
α−(t2−τ)qcτi =
∑T
τ=t1
α−(t2−τ)qcτi −
∑T
τ=t2
α−(t2−τ)qcτi . If the quantity q waits
until the end of period T but is never matched, the total waiting cost is simply
∑T
τ=t1
α−(t2−τ)cτi q.
The demand dti that arrives in period t, is either matched in some period τ (t≤ τ ≤ T ), lost, or
never matched until the end. We let ξ
[t1,t2]
i be the amount of d
t1
i that is matched in period t2
(t1 ≤ t2 ≤ T ), and ξ[t1,T+1]i be the amount of dt1i that waits until the end but is never matched.
Then, dt1i =
∑T+1
t2=t1
α−(t2−t1)ξ[t1,t2]i , and the total waiting cost incurred by d
t1
i is
T+1∑
t2=t1
[
T∑
τ=t1
α−(t2−τ)cτi ξ
[t1,t2]
i −
T∑
τ=t2
α−(t2−τ)cτi ξ
[t1,t2]
i ]
=
T+1∑
t2=t1
ξ
[t1,t2]
i [
T∑
τ=t1
α−(t2−τ)cτi −
T∑
τ=t2
α−(t2−τ)cτi ]
=
T+1∑
t2=t1
ξ
[t1,t2]
i
T∑
τ=t1
α−(t2−τ)cτi −
T+1∑
t2=t1
ξ
[t1,t2]
i
T∑
τ=t2
α−(t2−τ)cτi
=
T+1∑
t2=t1
ξ
[t1,t2]
i α
−(t2−t1)
T∑
τ=t1
α−(τ−t1)cτi −
T+1∑
t2=t1
ξ
[t1,t2]
i
T∑
τ=t2
α−(t2−τ)cτi
=dt1i
T∑
τ=t1
α−(τ−t1)cτi −
T∑
t2=t1
ξ
[t1,t2]
i
T∑
τ=t2
α−(t2−τ)cτi .
It follows that the total waiting cost incurred by type i demand in all periods is,
T∑
t1=1
[
dt1i
T∑
τ=t1
α−(τ−t1)cτi −
T∑
t2=t1
ξ
[t1,t2]
i
T∑
τ=t2
α−(t2−τ)cτi
]
=
T∑
t1=1
dt1i
T∑
τ=t1
α−(τ−t1)cτi −
T∑
t1=1
T∑
t2=t1
ξ
[t1,t2]
i
T∑
τ=t2
α−(t2−τ)cτi
=
T∑
t1=1
dt1i
T∑
τ=t1
α−(τ−t1)cτi −
T∑
t2=1
t2∑
t1=1
ξ
[t1,t2]
i
T∑
τ=t2
α−(t2−τ)cτi .
Let ξt2i =
∑t2
t1=1
ξ
[t1,t2]
i be the total quantity of type i demand matched in period t2. Then, it
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is equal to the total quantity of type i demand matched will all types of supply in period t, i.e.,
ξt2i =
∑n
j=1 q
t2
ij . Thus, we can rewrite the total waiting cost incurred by type i demand in all periods
as,
T∑
t1=1
dt1i
T∑
τ=t1
α−(τ−t1)cτi −
T∑
t2=1
t2∑
t1=1
ξ
[t1,t2]
i
T∑
τ=t2
α−(t2−τ)cτi
=
T∑
t1=1
dt1i
T∑
τ=t1
α−(τ−t1)cτi −
T∑
t2=1
ξt2i
T∑
τ=t2
α−(t2−τ)cτi
=
T∑
t1=1
dt1i
T∑
τ=t1
α−(τ−t1)cτi −
T∑
t2=1
n∑
j=1
qt2ij
T∑
τ=t2
α−(t2−τ)cτi .
Similarly, we can show that, the total waiting cost incurred by type j supply is
T∑
t1=1
st1j
T∑
τ=t1
β−(τ−t1)hτj −
T∑
t2=1
m∑
i=1
qt2ij
T∑
τ=t2
β−(t2−τ)hτj .
Then, the total matching reward less the waiting costs in all periods is
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈D,j∈S
rtijq
t
ij −
∑
i∈D
[
T∑
t1=1
dt1i
T∑
τ=t1
α−(τ−t1)cτi −
T∑
t2=1
n∑
j=1
qt2ij
T∑
τ=t2
α−(t2−τ)cτi
]
−
∑
j∈S
[
T∑
t1=1
st1j
T∑
τ=t1
β−(τ−t1)hτj −
T∑
t2=1
m∑
i=1
qt2ij
T∑
τ=t2
β−(t2−τ)hτj
]
=−
T∑
t1=1
∑
i∈D
dt1i
T∑
τ=t1
α−(τ−t1)cτi −
T∑
t1=1
∑
j∈S
st1j
T∑
τ=t1
β−(τ−t1)hτj
+
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈D,j∈S
rtijq
t
ij +
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈D
n∑
j=1
qtij
T∑
τ=t
α−(t−τ)cτi +
T∑
t=1
∑
j∈S
m∑
i=1
qtij
T∑
τ=t
β−(t−τ)hτj
=−
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈D
dti
T∑
τ=t
α−(τ−t)cτi −
T∑
t=1
∑
j∈S
stj
T∑
τ=t
β−(τ−t)hτj
+
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈D,j∈S
[
rtij +
T∑
τ=t
ατ−tcτj +
T∑
τ=t
βτ−thτj
]
qtij
=−
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈D
dti
T∑
τ=t
α−(τ−t)cτi −
T∑
t=1
∑
j∈S
stj
T∑
τ=t
β−(τ−t)hτj +
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈D,j∈S
r¯tijq
t
ij.
Note that the term
∑T
t=1
∑
i∈D,j∈S r¯
t
ijq
t
ij is the total reward for Problem (NW), if
the same matching decisions are used. Consequently, under the same feasible match-
ing policy, for any realization of demand and supply, the total reward for Prob-
lem (NW) is different from the total reward less waiting costs for Problem (W) by
−∑Tt=1∑i∈D dti∑Tτ=tα−(τ−t)cτi −∑Tt=1∑j∈S stj∑Tτ=t β−(τ−t)hτj . The expected different between the
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two is −∑Tt=1∑i∈DEDti∑Tτ=tα−(τ−t)cτi −∑Tt=1∑j∈S EStj∑Tτ=t β−(τ−t)hτj , which is a constant. Thus,
the two problems are equivalent to each other. 
D. An alternative formulation of the 2× 2 horizontal model
We reformulate the problem in terms of the new state z = (z1, z2) immediately prior to round 2 of
a period.
Matching between an imperfect pair happens only if z1 and z2 have the same sign (i.e., z1z2 ≥ 0).
More specifically, we consider the following cases.
Case 1: z1 ≥ 0 and z2 ≥ 0. After round 1 matching, a quantity z1 of type 1 demand is available to
be matched with a quantity z2 of type 2 supply. Let q be the matching quantity in round 2 between
type 1 demand and type 2 supply. We have 0 ≤ q ≤ min{z1, z2}. After round 2 matching, the
remaining quantity of type 1 demand is z1 and that of type 2 supply is z2− q. The post-matching
state is therefore (z1− q, z2− q).
Case 2: z1 < 0 and z2 < 0. After round 1 matching, a quantity −z1 of type 1 supply is available to
be matched with a quantity −z2 of type 2 demand. Let −q be the matching quantity in the round
2 between type 2 demand and type 1 supply. We have 0≤−q ≤min{−z1,−z2}, or equivalently,
max{z1, z2} ≤ q ≤ 0. After round 2 matching, the remaining quantity of type 1 supply is −z1 + q
and that of type 2 demand is −z2 + q. In other words, the post-matching state is (z1− q, z2− q).
Case 3: z1z2 < 0. After round 1 matching, either there is only demand available or only supply
available. The matching quantity in round 2 is q = 0. The post-matching state is (z1− q, z2− q) =
(z1, z2) (it is identical to the pre-matching state since there is no matching in round 2).
In any of the above three cases, the feasible space of matching decision in round 2 of a period t
is given by:
M(z) = {q | 0≤ q≤min(z1, z2) or max(z1, z2)≤ q≤ 0 or q= 0} . (D.4)
One can easily verify that M(z) is a lattice.
To reformulate the problem, we consider the total expected reward received from round 2 match-
ing in period t to the end of period T .
In period t, the matching quantity between type 1 demand and type 2 supply is q+, and that
between type 2 demand and type 1 supply is q−. Thus, a total reward rt12q
+ + rt21q
− is received in
round 2 of period t.
Given that the post-matching state in period t is (z1 − q, z2 − q) after round 2, in the
beginning of period t + 1 the available quantity of type 1 demand is α(z1 − q)+ + Dt+11 ,
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that of type 2 demand is α(z2 − q)− + Dt+12 , that of type 1 supply is β(z1 − q)− + St+11 ,
and that of type 2 supply is β(z2 − q)+ + St+12 . In round 1 of period t + 1, type 1 demand
and type 1 supply will be matched greedily, and so will type 2 demand and type 2 sup-
ply. This results in the total expected reward rt+111 Emin
{
α(z1− q)+ +Dt+11 , β(z1− q)−+St+11
}
+
rt+122 Emin
{
α(z2− q)−+Dt+12 , β(z2− q)+ +St+12
}
in round 1 of period t+ 1. The state immediately
prior to round 2 of period t+ 1 is (α(z1− q)+ +Dt+11 −β(z1− q)−−St+11 , β(z2− q)+ +St+12 −α(z2−
q)−−Dt+12 ).
Let us define Jt(q,z) as the total expected reward received from round 2 of period t until the end
of period T if the round 2 matching decision in period t is q. We also define Ut(z) as the optimal
total expected reward achievable (by using the optimal q) from round 2 of period t until the end
of period T . We are now ready to present the reformulation.
Ut(z) = max
q∈M(z)
Jt(q,z) (D.5)
Jt(q,z) =r
t
12q
+ + rt21q
−+ rt+111 Emin
{
α(z1− q)+ +Dt+11 , β(z1− q)−+St+11
}
+ rt+122 Emin
{
α(z2− q)−+Dt+12 , β(z2− q)+ +St+12
}
+EUt+1(α(z1− q)+ +Dt+11 −β(z1− q)−−St+11 , β(z2− q)+ +St+12 −α(z2− q)−−Dt+12 ).
(D.6)
We show the concavity of Ut and Jt in the following lemma.
Lemma D.8. Ut(z) is concave in z and Jt(q,z) is concave in q for any given z.
Proof of Lemma D.8. Suppose that the (original) state in the beginning of period t is given
as x1 = z1, x2 = 0, y1 = 0 and y2 = z2. The matching quantity in round 1 is zero since there is no
type 2 demand or type 1 supply available. By definition, we have Ut(z) = Vt(z1,0,0, z2). Since Vt is
concave, Ut(z) is concave in z.
To show that Jt(q,z) is concave in q for any given z, we assume z1 ≥ 0 and z2 ≥ 0 without loss
of generality. The concavity of Jt with respect to q can be proved analogously. 
E. An alternative formulation of the vertical model
We reformulate the vertical model with a transformed system state and the total matching quantity
Q as the decision variable in each period.
We define x˜i :=
∑i
k=1 xk for i = 1, . . . ,m and y˜j :=
∑j
k=1 yk (x˜0 and y˜0 are defined as zero) as
the transformed system state, u˜i =
∑i
k=1 uk and v˜j =
∑i
k=1 vk as the transformed post-matching
levels. In addition, let D˜ti =
∑i
k=1D
t
k and S˜
t
j =
∑j
k=1S
t
k be the transformed random variables that
represents new arrivals of demand and supply in period t.
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Let us define Uk as the k × k upper triangular matrix with all the entries on or above the
diagonal equal to one. Then the state transformation can be written in a matrix form: xUn = x˜
and yUm = y˜. Equivalently, we can write x˜ = xU
−1
m and y˜ = yV
−1
n . Here U
−1
m and V
−1
n are the
inverse matrices of Um and Vn, respectively. One can easily verify that both U
−1
m and V
−1
n have
all their diagonal entries equal to 1 and each off-diagonal entry right above a diagonal entry equal
to −1.
The decision variable, total matching quantity Q, satisfies that Q ≤min{x˜m, y˜n}. Under top-
down matching, a total quantity min{x˜i,Q} is consumed for types 1, . . . , i demand combined, for
any i∈D. Thus, the quantity of type i demand being consumed is
min{x˜i,Q}−min{x˜i−1,Q}=x˜i− x˜i−1− (x˜i−Q)+ + (x˜i−1−Q)+,
i.e., the total consumed quantity of types 1, . . . , i demand less the total consumed quantity of types
1, . . . , i−1 demand. This contributes the reward rtid[x˜i− x˜i−1−(x˜i−Q)++(x˜i−1−Q)+] from demand
type i. Likewise, supply type j contributes the reward rtjs[y˜j − y˜j−1 − (y˜j −Q)+ + (y˜j−1 −Q)+] in
period t. Consequently, the total reward received in period t is
m∑
i=1
rtid[x˜i− x˜i−1− (x˜i−Q)+ + (x˜i−1−Q)+] +
n∑
j=1
rtjs[y˜j − y˜j−1− (y˜j −Q)+ + (y˜j−1−Q)+]
=
m∑
i=1
(rtid− rti+1,d)x˜i +
n∑
i=1
(rtjs− rtj+1,d)y˜j −
m∑
i=1
(rtid− rti+1,d)(x˜i−Q)+−
n∑
i=1
(rtjs− rtj+1,d)(y˜j −Q)+
=x˜U−1m (r
t
d)
T + y˜V−1n (r
t
s)
T− (x˜−Q1m)+U−1m (rtd)T− (y˜−Q1m)+V−1n (rts)T
where rtm+1,d = r
t
n+1,s := 0.
In the end of period t, the remaining quantity of types 1, . . . , i demand combined is (x˜i −Q)+
and the remaining quantity of types 1, . . . , j supply combined is (y˜j −Q)+. Thus, the transformed
post-matching levels are given by (u˜, v˜) = ((x˜ −Q1m)+, (y˜ −Q1n)+). The transformed state in
period t+ 1 is (x˜t+1, y˜t+1) = (α(x˜−Q1m)+ + D˜t+1, β(y˜−Q1n)+ + S˜t+1), which can be converted
back to the original state as (xt+1,yt+1) = (x˜t+1U
−1
m , y˜t+1V
−1
n ).
If the total matching quantity in period is Q, the maximun total expected reward achievable
from period t to period T is
Gt(Q, x˜, y˜) =x˜U
−1
m (r
t
d)
T + y˜V−1n (r
t
s)
T− (x˜−Q1m)+U−1m (rtd)T− (y˜−Q1m)+V−1n (rts)T
+EVt+1(α(x˜−Q1m)+U−1m + D˜t+1U−1m , β(y˜−Q1n)+V−1n + S˜t+1V−1n ) (E.7)
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given the transformed state (x˜, y˜) in period t. The optimal total expected reward from period t to
period T is thus
Vt(x˜U
−1
m , y˜V
−1
n ) = max
0≤Q≤x˜m∧y˜n
Gt(Q, x˜, y˜). (E.8)
Let V˜t(x˜, y˜) := Vt(x˜U
−1
m , y˜U
−1
n )− x˜U−1m (rtd)T− y˜U−1n (rts)T. Equations (E.7) and (E.8) are equiv-
alent to:
V˜t(x˜, y˜) = max
0≤Q≤x˜m∧y˜n
G˜t(x˜, y˜). (E.9)
G˜t(Q, x˜, y˜) =−(x˜−Q1m)+U−1m (rtd−αrt+1d )T− (y˜−Q1m)+V−1n (rts−βrt+1s )T
+EV˜t+1(α(x˜−Q1m)+ + D˜t+1, β(y˜−Q1n)+ + S˜t+1) (E.10)
Since VT+1(x,y)≡ 0, we have V˜T+1(x˜, y˜)≡−x˜U−1m (rtd)T− y˜U−1n (rts)T.
Finally, we have the following property for the function V˜t(x˜, y˜).
Lemma E.9. Suppose that rtid − rti+1,d ≥ α(rt+1id − rt+1i+1,d) and rtjs − rtj+1,s ≥ β(rt+1js − rt+1j+1,s) for
i= 1, . . . ,m−1, j = 1, . . . , n−1 and t= 1, . . . , T −1. Then, for any period t= 1, . . . , T , the function
V˜t(x˜, y˜) is decreasing in xi for i= 1, . . . ,m− 1 and in yjfor all j = 1, . . . , n− 1.
Proof of Lemma E.9. By definition of the function V˜t, for i= 1, . . . ,m− 1, we have
V˜t(x˜ + εe
m
i , y˜)− V˜t(x˜, y˜)
=Vt(x + εe
m
i − εemi+1,y)− (x + εemi − εemi+1)(rtd)T−y(rts)T−Vt(x,y) + x(rtd)T−y(rts)T
=Vt(x + εe
m
i − εemi+1,y)−Vt(x,y)− (rtid− rti+1,d)ε, (E.11)
where x = x˜U−1m and y = y˜V
−1
n .
By Lemma A.1, there exists λτj′ ≥ 0 for j′ = 1, . . . , n and τ = t, . . . , T such that∑T
τ=tα
−(τ−t)∑n
j′=1 λ
τ
j′ ≤ ε and Vt(x + εemi − εemi+1,y)−Vt(x,y)≤
∑T
τ=t
∑n
j′=1 λ
τ
j′(r
τ
ij′ − rτi+1,j′). Fol-
lowing (E.11), we have
V˜t(x˜ + εe
m
i , y˜)− V˜t(x˜, y˜)
≤
T∑
τ=t
n∑
j′=1
λτj′(r
τ
ij′ − rτi+1,j′)− (rtid− rti+1,d)ε
≤
T∑
τ=t
α−(τ−t)
n∑
j′=1
λτj′(r
t
ij′ − rti+1,j′)− (rtid− rti+1,d)ε
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=
T∑
τ=t
α−(τ−t)
n∑
j′=1
λτj′(r
t
id− rti+1,d)− (rtid− rti+1,d)ε
=[
T∑
τ=t
α−(τ−t)
n∑
j′=1
λτj′ − ε](rtid− rti+1,d)
≤0.
Therefore, V˜t(x˜, y˜) is decreasing in x˜i for i= 1, . . . ,m− 1. Similarly, we can show that V˜t(x˜, y˜) is
decreasing in y˜j for j = 1, . . . , n− 1. 
F. One-step-ahead policy for the vertical model
The one-step-ahead policy assumes greedy matching from the next period to the end of the horizon.
Let V gt (x,y) be the total expected reward received under the greedy policy from period t to period
T , given that the state in period t is (x,y). The one-step-ahead policy chooses the decision in
period t to maximize the sum of the immediate reward in period t and the future expected reward
V gt (x,y). In this appendix, we explore properties of the function V
g
t (x,y) and the one-step-ahead
policy.
Let V˜ gt (x,y) := V
g
t (x,y)− x˜U−1m (rtd)T− y˜U−1n (rts)T. In the following lemma, we present recursive
equation satisfied by V˜ gt (x,y).
Lemma F.10. The function V˜ gt (x,y) satisfies the following recursive equations:
V˜ gt (x˜, y˜) =ED˜
t+1U−1m +ES˜
t+1V−1n − (x˜− y˜n1m)+U−1m (rtd−αrt+1d )T− (y˜− x˜m1n)+V−1n (rts−βrt+1s )T
+EV˜ gt+1(α(x˜− y˜n1m)+ + D˜t+1, β(y˜− x˜m1n)+ + S˜t+1) (F.12)
Proof of Lemma F.10. Assuming that the greedy policy will be used from period t+1 to period
T , the total expected reward received by using a top-down matching in period t with the total
matching quantity Q is
Ft(Q, x˜, y˜) =x˜U
−1
m (r
t
d)
T + y˜V−1n (r
t
s)
T− (x˜−Q1m)+U−1m (rtd)T− (y˜−Q1m)+V−1n (rts)T
+EV gt+1(α(x˜−Q1m)+U−1m + D˜t+1U−1m , β(y˜−Q1n)+V−1n + S˜t+1V−1n
=x˜U−1m (r
t
d)
T + y˜V−1n (r
t
s)
T +ED˜t+1U−1m +ES˜
t+1V−1n
− (x˜−Q1m)+U−1m (rtd−αrt+1d )T− (y˜−Q1m)+V−1n (rts−βrt+1s )T
+EV˜ gt+1(α(x˜−Q1m)+ + D˜t+1, β(y˜−Q1n)+ + S˜t+1) (F.13)
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If greedy matching is used in period t, then the matching quantity Q is equal to x˜m ∧ y˜n. Thus,
V gt (x˜, y˜) =Ft(x˜m ∧ y˜n, x˜, y˜) (F.14)
=x˜U−1m (r
t
d)
T + y˜V−1n (r
t
s)
T +ED˜t+1U−1m +ES˜
t+1V−1n
− (x˜− x˜m ∧ y˜n1m)+U−1m (rtd−αrt+1d )T− (y˜− x˜m ∧ y˜n1m)+V−1n (rts−βrt+1s )T
+EV˜ gt+1(α(x˜− x˜m ∧ y˜n1m)+ + D˜t+1, β(y˜− x˜m ∧ y˜n1n)+ + S˜t+1). (F.15)
If x˜i ≤ y˜n, then x˜i ≤ x˜m∧ y˜n and thus (x˜i− x˜m∧ y˜n)+ = 0. If x˜i > y˜n, then x˜m ≥ x˜i > y˜n and thus
(x˜i − x˜m ∧ y˜n)+ = (x˜i − y˜n)+ = x˜i − y˜n. It follows that (x˜i − x˜m ∧ y˜n)+ = (x˜i − y˜n)+ and therefore
(x˜− x˜m ∧ y˜n1m)+ = (x˜− y˜n1m)+. Likewise, we can show that (y˜− x˜m ∧ y˜n1n)+ = (y˜− x˜m1n)+.
Equation (F.12) then follows from (F.15). 
The next lemma shows the monotonicity of the function V˜ gt (x˜, y˜).
Lemma F.11. Suppose that rtid− rti+1,d ≥ α(rt+1id − rt+1i+1,d) for all t= 1, . . . , T − 1. Then, for any
period t= 1, . . . , T , the function V˜ gt (x˜, y˜) is decreasing in xi for all i= 1, . . . ,m and in yj for all
j = 1 . . . , n.
Proof of Lemma F.11. We will show by induction that V˜ gt (x˜ + εe
m
i , y˜) decreases in x˜i.
It is trivial to prove for t= T +1, given that V˜ gt (x˜, y˜)≡−x˜U−1m (rtd)T− y˜U−1n (rts)T. Let us suppose
that V˜ gt+1(x˜, y˜) is decreasing in x˜i.
To show that V˜ gt (x˜, y˜) is decreasing in x˜i, we note that
−
m∑
i=1
(x˜− y˜n1m)+U−1m (rtd−αrt+1d )T = (x˜i− y˜n)+[(rtid− rti+1,d)−α(rt+1id − rt+1i+1,d)]
is decreasing in x˜i. According to the induction hypothesis, the last term in (F.12), EV˜
g
t+1(α(x˜−
y˜n1m)
+U−1m +D˜
t+1U−1m , β(y˜− x˜m1n)+V−1n + S˜t+1V−1n ) is decreasing in x˜i. Thus, all terms in (F.12)
are either constant or decreasing in x˜i. This completes the induction and shows that V˜
g
t (x˜, y˜) is
decreasing in x˜i. We show that it is also decreasing in y˜j similarly. 
Next, we show that V˜ gt (x˜, y˜) is concave.
Lemma F.12. Suppose that rtid − rti+1,d ≥ α(rt+1id − rt+1i+1,d) for all t = 1, . . . , T − 1. The function
V˜ gt (x˜, y˜) is concave in (x˜, y˜).
Proof of Lemma F.12. The proof is again inductive. It is easy to see that V˜ gT+1 is concave (it is
actually linear). Suppose that V˜ gt+1 is concave.
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The terms −(x˜− y˜n1m)+U−1m (rtd−αrt+1d )T and −(y˜− x˜m1n)+V−1n (rts− βrt+1s )T are concave due
to the concavity of the function f(x) := −x+. It remains to show that EV˜ gt+1(α(x˜ − y˜n1m)+ +
D˜t+1, β(y˜− x˜m1n)+ + S˜t+1) is concave. For λ1 ≥ 0 and λ2 ≥ 0 such that λ1 +λ2 = 1, we have
(λ1x˜ +λ2x˜
′−λ1y˜n1m−λ2y˜′n1m)+ ≤ λ1(x˜− y˜n1m)+ +λ2(x˜′− y˜′n1m)+,
and
(λ1y˜ +λ2y˜
′−λ1x˜m1n−λ2x˜′m1n)+ ≤ λ1(y˜− x˜m1n)+ +λ2(y˜′− x˜′m1n)+,
where both inequalities follow from the convexity of the function g(x) := x+. Since V˜ gt+1 is decreasing
in its arguments (Lemma F.11), we have
V˜ gt+1(α(λ1x˜ +λ2x˜
′−λ1y˜n1m−λ2y˜′n1m)+ + D˜t+1, β(λ1y˜ +λ2y˜′−λ1x˜m1n−λ2x˜′m1n)+ + S˜t+1)
≥V˜ gt+1(λ1 · [α(x˜− y˜n1m)+ + D˜t+1] +λ2 · [α(x˜′− y˜′n1m)+ + D˜t+1],
λ1 · [β(y˜− x˜m1n)+ + S˜t+1] +λ2 · [β(y˜′− x˜′m1n)+ + S˜t+1])
≥λ1V˜ gt+1(α(x˜− y˜n1m)+ + D˜t+1, β(y˜− x˜m1n)+ + S˜t+1)
+λ2V˜
g
t+1(α(x˜
′− y˜′n1m)+ + D˜t+1, β(y˜′− x˜′m1n)+ + S˜t+1),
where the last inequality follows from the induction hypothesis of the concavity of V˜ gt+1. 
The following proposition shows that the one-step-ahead policy has the top-down structure, i.e.,
in any period t, a lower-quality demand/supply type will not be consumed, unless all higher-quality
types are fully used.
Proposition F.2. The one-step-ahead policy has the top-down structure in each period t.
Proof of Proposition F.2. Let Q be the matching decision in period t under the one-step-ahead
policy and (u,v) be the post-matching levels. Since we consider linearly additive reward, it is
sufficient to show that there is no “blanks” for the matching decision in any period t, i.e., for i′ > i,
qi′j > 0 would imply that ui = 0, and for j
′ > j, qij′ > 0 would imply that vj = 0. That is, due to
the linearly additive reward structure, M is sufficient to ensure Ms .
We suppose to the contrary that both qi′j and ui are positive for some i
′ > i, in a period t under
the one-step-ahead policy. We will construct a feasible decision that has the top-down structure
and is weakly better than the current decision in period t.
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To construct the new decision, in period t we reduce the consumption of type i′ demand by ε and
increase that of type i demand by ε, where ε= min{qij′ , ui}. By doing so, either the consumption
of type i′ demand becomes zero or type i demand is fully used. the matching reward received in
period t increases by (rtid− rti′d)ε, and the post matching levels become (u− εemi + εemi′ ,v). Under
greedy matching, the change in the total expected reward from period t+ 1 to period T is
EV gt+1(αu−αεemi +αεemi′ + Dt+1, βv + St+1)−EV gt+1(αu + Dt+1, βv + St+1)
=EV˜ gt+1(αu˜−αε
i′−1∑
i′′=i
emi′′ + D˜
t+1, βv˜ + S˜t+1)
+ (αu˜−αε
i′−1∑
i′′=i
emi′′ +ED˜
t+1)U˜−1m (r
t+1
d )
T + (βv˜ +ES˜t+1)V−1n (r
t+1
s )
T
−EV˜ gt+1(αu˜ + D˜t+1, βv˜ + S˜t+1)− (αu˜ +ED˜t+1)U˜−1m (rt+1d )T− (βv˜ +ES˜t+1)V−1n (rt+1s )T
=EV˜ gt+1(αu˜−αε
i′−1∑
i′′=i
emi′′ + D˜
t+1, βv˜ + S˜t+1)−EV˜ gt+1(αu˜ + D˜t+1, βv˜ + S˜t+1)−αε(
i′−1∑
i′′=i
emi′′)U˜
−1
m (r
t+1
d )
T
≥−αε(
i′−1∑
i′′=i
emi′′)U˜
−1
m (r
t+1
d )
T
=−αε(rt+1id − rt+1i′d ).
Thus, the change in the total reward from period t to period T is no less than (rtid − rti′d)ε−
αε(rt+1id − rt+1i′d ) = [(rtid − rti′d)− α(rt+1id − rt+1i′d )]ε ≥ 0. This implies that the total expected reward
increases by reducing the consumption of type i′ demand by ε and increasing that of type i demand
by ε.
Analogously, we can show that total expected reward also increases if we reduce the consumption
of type j′ supply and increase that of type j < j′ supply by the same amount.
We repeatedly transfer quantity from a lower-quality type to a higher-quality type in period t,
and will eventually arrive at a decision that has the top-down structure. 
Proposition F.2 implies that under the one-step-ahead policy, the matching decision in a period t
is fully determined by the total matching quantity Q. Therefore, the one-step-ahead policy reduces
to a one-dimension problem for choosing Q to maximize the total expected reward from period t to
period T , provided that greedy matching is enforced starting from period t+ 1. We conclude this
appendix by presenting a formulation of the optimization problem associated with one-step-ahead
policy and showing its concavity.
Proposition F.3. The optimal matching quantity Q∗ in period t under the one-step-ahead pol-
icy solves the following problem.
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max
0≤Q≤x˜m∧y˜n
Ft(Q, x˜, y˜) :=x˜U
−1
m (r
t
d)
T + y˜V−1n (r
t
s)
T +ED˜t+1U−1m +ES˜
t+1V−1n
− (x˜−Q1m)+U−1m (rtd−αrt+1d )T− (y˜−Q1m)+V−1n (rts−βrt+1s )T
+EV˜ gt+1(α(x˜−Q1m)+ + D˜t+1, β(y˜−Q1n)+ + S˜t+1). (F.16)
The function Ft(Q, x˜, y˜) is concave in Q, and represents the total expected reward to be received
from period t to period T for using the total matching quantity Q in period t and greedy matching
from period t+ 1 on.
Proof of Proposition F.3. In the proof of Lemma F.10, we have shown that Ft defined in (F.16)
is the total expected reward to be received from period t to period T for matching a total quanitty
Q under the top-down matching structure in period t and applying the greedy policy from period
t to period T + 1.
Thus, it remains to show that Ft is concave in Q. We now show that all terms on the right-hand-
side of (F.16) is concave in Q. It is easy to see that the term x˜U−1m (r
t
d)
T + y˜V−1n (r
t
s)
T is concave,
due to its linearity. The terms −(x˜−Q1m)+U−1m (rtd−αrt+1d )T and (y˜−Q1m)+V−1n (rts−βrt+1s )T are
concave because the function g(x) :=−x+ is concave.
It remains to prove that EV˜ gt+1(α(x˜−Q1m)+ + D˜t+1, β(y˜−Q1n)+ + S˜t+1) is concave. To that
end, let λ1 ≥ 0 and λ2 ≥ 0 such that λ1 +λ2 = 1. For two quantities Q and Q′, we have
V˜ gt+1(α(x˜− (λ1Q+λ2Q′)1m)+ + D˜t+1, β(y˜− (λ1Q+λ2Q′)1n)+ + S˜t+1)
=V˜ gt+1(α[λ1(x˜−Q1m) +λ2(x˜−Q′1m)]+ + D˜t+1, β[λ1(y˜−Q1n) +λ2(y˜−Q′1n)]+ + S˜t+1)
≥V˜ gt+1(λ1[α(x˜−Q1m)+ + D˜t+1] +λ2[α(x˜−Q′1m)+ + D˜t+1],
λ1[β(y˜−Q1n)+ + S˜t+1] +λ2[β(y˜−Q′1n)+ + S˜t+1])
≥λ1V˜ gt+1(α(x˜−Q1m)+ + D˜t+1, β(y˜−Q1n)+ + S˜t+1) +λ2V˜ gt+1(α(x˜−Q′1m)+ + D˜t+1, β(y˜−Q′1n)+ + S˜t+1),
where the first inequality follows from the convexity of the function g(x) := x+ and the fact that
V˜t+1 is decreasing in its arguments (Lemma F.11), and the second inequality follows from the
concavity of V˜ gt+1. 
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